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3PREFACE 
America’s economic recovery is finally taking hold and current deficits are down from the record 
highs during the recession. At the same time, far too many American families are being left out of the 
recovery, and our nation still faces an unsustainable long-term fiscal outlook. Lower unemployment and 
improvements in growth are fueling renewed optimism, yet the nature of the recovery is uneven and the 
longer term trends of income stagnation are of great concern. On everyone’s minds is the questionable 
state of opportunity in America. 
The current economic environment allows more room to maneuver and provides a window to plan for 
success—making smart, reasoned decisions that will benefit America over the long term. Seizing the 
opportunity to build a solid fiscal foundation will help enable the economic opportunity that is the basis 
of the American dream. With a fiscal outlook that is stable and sustainable, we can better ensure that 
we have sufficient resources to invest in our future, which can lead to greater economic growth and 
more widely shared prosperity for future generations. 
In the interest of enriching the discussion on the state of economic opportunity in America today, the 
Peter G. Peterson Foundation asked two experts, representing different viewpoints, to recommend 
policy options to foster greater economic opportunity and mobility. Their papers are presented in this 
volume. 
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5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While we would like to believe that America is a meritocracy wherein anyone who works hard enough 
can realize their economic potential, this ideal is unfortunately far from today’s reality. An extensive 
body of research documents that poor children, for example, have substantially reduced opportunity for 
economic success in adulthood than their higher-income peers.
Though social science has long documented such associations—the negative relationship between 
children’s economic status, their educational opportunity, and their economic outcomes is well-
established—the growth of income, wage, and wealth inequality has led to new concerns in this critical 
area of inquiry. We begin by documenting this greater inequality of outcomes across many different 
variables associated with living standards. 
We then argue that this growth in inequality of outcomes, which we distinguish from inequality of 
opportunities, is constraining opportunity in ways that are inconsistent with the meritocratic ideal. We 
identify three channels through which this process is occurring: residential segregation, unequal access 
to quality education, and direct effects of inequality. 
First, inequality in outcomes drives increasing residential segregation by income. The environmental 
hazards and lower-quality public goods common in high-poverty neighborhoods have negative impacts 
on children’s cognition, academics, and later life outcomes.
Second, inequality in outcomes leads to unequal access to quality educational experiences throughout 
a child’s lifetime. Because low-income parents lack the resources of higher-income parents, including 
both money and time, children who grow up in low-income households have less access to enrichment 
opportunities from an early age. Insufficient and inequitable investments in public education have 
disadvantaged low-income students in primary and secondary schools as districts have had to cut staff, 
expand class sizes, and forego research-based reforms. The prospect of substantial college debt also 
presents a major obstacle for low-income students who overcome challenges and seek a postsecondary 
degree.
Third, the direct effects of inequality—lower incomes and wealth levels themselves—may be the most 
significant obstacle to equality of opportunity. Research shows that poverty in childhood is associated 
with suboptimal cognitive development, poor health, difficulties in school, and lower employment and 
earnings in adulthood.
Note that as the inequality of outcomes increase over time, these channels of diminished opportunity 
are strengthened. 
The good news is that specific, evidence-based policy solutions can begin to counter these effects 
and improve economic opportunities for millions of Americans. For example, federal, state, and local 
agencies can combat residential segregation by making improvements to federal rental assistance 
programs. While the best methods to reduce neighborhood inequality require more substantive 
interventions, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) can help hundreds of 
thousands of low-income children now through straightforward modifications of the Housing Choice 
Vouchers (HCV) program. 
There are also a number of ways to reduce educational barriers to mobility. Universal, publicly-funded 
pre-kindergarten is a great place to start; early childhood education has well-documented positive 
effects on future life outcomes. At the primary and secondary school level, delivering funding and 
6services according to student need should be the top priority. And we can also promote college access 
and completion by substantially reducing the costs required for low- and moderate-income students to 
attend. 
Most importantly, to establish a more equal starting gate and provide a more robust set of 
opportunities for people to realize the benefits of their education, we must confront inequality and 
poverty head on. We suggest policy ideas to improve “market outcomes” for low-income families, 
including higher minimum wages, direct job creation and apprenticeship programs for the hard-to-
employ, and fair chance hiring for job seekers with criminal records. We also underscore the importance 
of strengthening the social safety net, which means both protecting effective programs that currently 
exist, like nutrition assistance programs and wage subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
expanding key aspects of these programs, including Medicaid (i.e., we advocate that states adopt the 
Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act) and tax credit provisions scheduled to expire in 2017.
Most of these policy ideas invoke public costs, though they also yield public benefits, such as less need 
for government services later in life. Where possible, we will cite costs as well as “payfors.” However, 
our goal here is not write detailed legislation, but to present our diagnosis of America’s inequality and 
mobility challenges and our prescriptions to help meet them.
INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the relationship between economic outcomes and economic opportunity in 
America. Thus, a good place to start is to define those concepts. 
By opportunity, we mean the ability of people to achieve their economic potential. Opportunity implies 
access to educational experiences that enable children to realize their intellectual potential. It implies 
freedom of movement across geographic boundaries, so families can live in places with quality public 
goods that broadly meet their preferences. It implies the ability to live a healthy life in which basic 
needs are met in an environment free from avoidable illnesses. Opportunity also implies the absence 
of unjust barriers to success based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other personal 
characteristics. Of course, equal opportunities don’t necessarily imply equal outcomes. Different 
endowments and efforts can also influence economic outcomes. But striving to enhance equality 
of opportunities in the face of the barriers we document throughout this paper is, in our view, an 
important role for public policy.
In the economic literature, opportunity is often discussed in terms of mobility, which in turn has 
two distinct but related types. The first, often called relative mobility, tracks a family or individual’s 
outcomes relative to peers. Relative mobility doesn’t just describe how much an individual’s income 
or educational attainment rose over time. It describes how she did on such variables compared to her 
cohort. For example, consider the relative mobility of a child born to a family at the 20th percentile of 
the income scale. If, when she grows up, say at age 30, that former child’s income still places her adult 
self at the 20th income percentile, then we’d say she’s experienced no relative mobility, even if that new 
20th percentile income level is higher than the one that prevailed during her childhood.
Suppose, however, that even while this person remains at the same income percentile as when she 
was a child, her real income is up 40 percent compared to that of her family 30 years ago. That income 
growth also represents a form of upward mobility, which is typically called absolute mobility. We would 
generally expect to see more of this second type of mobility. After all, the economy grows most years—
7recessions wherein GDP contracts are thankfully rare—and so we’d generally expect each birth cohort 
to do better than those that came before. That is, as per-capita income broadly rises most years, we 
would a-priori expect higher incomes to reach subsequent cohorts. 
Of course, the issue of income inequality—one that looms large in much of what follows—must be 
considered. As rising inequality channeled more growth to the wealthy and away from the middle class 
over the past thirty-five years, we might expect to find that the income of later cohorts grew more 
slowly. We examine such a trend below and find that increasing inequality has in fact coincided with 
reduced absolute mobility.
In terms of opportunity, both relative and absolute mobility are important, but relative mobility is 
arguably more so. If I can tell, based on a child’s zip code, her parents’ education, and/or where she 
started out on the income scale, roughly where she will end up in terms of her relative income class (as 
is too often the case today), most people would agree that opportunity is inadequate. On the other 
hand, if children born into the bottom fifth, middle fifth, and top fifth of the income distribution all have 
the same probability of ending up in the top fifth as adults, most of us would believe there to be some 
degree of equal opportunity.
Belle Sawhill and Richard Reeves, two scholars who have written extensively on these issues, agree: 
“Even if everyone is richer than their parents, we would be a deeply unfair society if everyone was also 
stuck on exactly the same point on the income ladder. We want growth and more prosperity, but we 
also want fluidity and more fairness.”1
As we show, these two types of mobility are related in important ways, namely through inequality 
of outcomes. We document various channels through which this correlation appears to be activated, 
such as the diminished ability of poor families to invest in enrichment goods for their children, the 
environmental hazards in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, and the “toxic stress” often 
associated with prolonged financial hardship. 
This paper thus proceeds by describing key trends in unequal outcomes, noting their implications for 
levels of absolute mobility in the United States. After reviewing the state of relative mobility as well, we 
show how an analysis of the inequality-induced trends in the three areas mentioned above—residential 
segregation, educational investment barriers, and the direct effects of poverty and inequality—yields 
policy prescriptions that improve economic outcomes and, in doing so, reduce opportunity barriers.  
THE STATE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
I. ABSOLUTE MOBILITY
As we document in the pages that follow, the increasing inequality of outcomes has a serious impact on 
relative mobility. It also indicates diminished levels of absolute mobility, as described below.
Using a wide variety of data sources and income definitions, Bernstein and Spielberg find that wage, 
income, and wealth inequality have significantly increased, and real wage and income growth has 
slowed or stagnated for significant groups of workers and families.2 In this regard, we argue that 
inequality has had created a “wedge” between overall growth and the earnings, incomes, and wealth of 
most Americans over the past three or four decades. 
8This wedge manifests in a number of ways, one of which is a gap between productivity and median 
wage growth. Between 1973 and 2011, labor productivity, defined as economic output (GDP) divided 
by total hours worked, grew 80.4 percent. During that same period, the real median hourly wage rose 
by only 4.0 percent.3 
Another manifestation of the wedge is differential rates of income growth and wealth accumulation 
for different groups of people—average rates fail to account for the distribution of absolute mobility. 
Between 1986 and 2012, as Saez and Zucman recently documented, “the average [annual] real growth 
rate of wealth per family has been 1.9%, but this average masks considerable heterogeneity: for the 
bottom 90%, wealth has not grown at all, while it has risen 5.3% per year for the top 0.1%, so that 
almost half of aggregate wealth accumulation has been due to the top 0.1% alone.”4
Finally, and most relevant to a discussion of the distribution of opportunity, the wedge has led to 
“stickier” poverty rates over time, which means that poverty has been less responsive to growth than in 
years past. Danziger has explained that the relationship between per capita GDP growth and declining 
poverty rates between 1959 and 1973 would have predicted the eradication of poverty in the mid-
1980s, even after accounting for declining GDP growth.5 Of course, the eradication of poverty did not 
happen, and a decomposition of the factors responsible suggests that income inequality has played a 
much larger role than any other factor in dampening growth’s impact on absolute mobility.6
To be clear, the empirical trends do reveal many examples of absolute mobility, as the real wages and 
incomes of various cohorts rise as they age. The Pew Economic Mobility Project, for example, notes that 
around ninety percent of children who grow up in low- and moderate-income households have higher 
incomes as adults, in absolute terms, than their parents had.7 But as noted above, simply based on 
overall economic growth, we’d expect each generation to have at least somewhat higher income levels 
than earlier generations. To cite the existence of absolute mobility reveals little about our key question 
about access to opportunity. 
However, at least by one metric—Census Bureau median family income data—absolute, real income 
growth has slowed or even declined for subsequent birth cohorts of families headed by 35-44 year olds, 
especially since 2000. Despite significant gains in GDP and productivity since then, their 2013 income is 
only slightly above the level in 1979.8 So even what we consider a low bar—the growth of family income 
across birth cohorts—has not always been met in recent years.
Year Median Income, 35-44 Year-Olds Percent Change
1949 28,471
1959 42,962 51%
1969 61,578 43%
1979 68,522 11%
1989 72,922 6%
2000 78,575 8%
2007 76,227 -3%
2013 70,239 -8%
With wage and income stagnation inhibiting the opportunity component of absolute mobility in 
this sense, relative mobility is a particularly germane metric in getting to the heart of the equality of 
opportunity question.
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Both Sawhill and Reeves and the Pew Economic Mobility Project underscore the following as one of the 
most salient points about relative mobility in the US: “Americans raised at the bottom and top of the 
family income ladder are likely to remain there as adults.” 70 percent of children born into the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution (at or below the 20th percentile) remain below the middle quintile 
(40th to 60th percentiles) as adults, and 63 percent of children born into the top quintile (at or above 
the 80th percentile) remain above the middle quintile as adults. Only 4 percent of people are able to 
make it all the way from the bottom to the top, and only 8 percent drop all the way from the top to the 
bottom.9 The literature labels this phenomenon “stickiness at the ends,” and such numbers represent 
a substantial disconnect between the ideal of equality of opportunity and the current state of relative 
mobility in the United States.
Relative mobility in the U.S. lags relative mobility in other countries. Although international comparisons 
can be difficult, Reeves and Sawhill note that “the broad picture that emerges from these comparisons 
is fairly clear and consistent: within economically-developed countries, mobility rates are highest in 
Scandinavia and lowest in the U.S., U.K., and Italy—with Australia, Western Europe, and Canada lying 
somewhere in between.” Reeves and Sawhill also point out that careful comparisons of the U.S. and 
Canada find that “Canadian rates of mobility appear to be higher.”10 
It is important to remember that the level of relative mobility in the United States, while lower than 
that of other countries, does not appear to have decreased over the past thirty-five years. As Chetty, 
Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner note, a child born into the 20th income percentile today has about 
the same opportunity to rise up the income scale relative to his or her peers as did a child born 
into the 20th income percentile in the 1970s. However, Chetty et al also highlight the connection 
between absolute mobility and relative mobility referenced above—“because inequality has risen, the 
consequences of the ‘birth lottery’—the parents to whom a child is born—are larger today than in the 
past.”11 
PATHWAYS TO ENHANCED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
While many mobility barriers surely exist, we believe research suggests three major obstacles to equality 
of opportunity: residential segregation, educational investment barriers, and the direct effects of 
low income levels themselves. The following subsections explore each of these barriers and suggest 
pathways around them that can promote more equal access to opportunity.
I. REDUCE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
The Problems
Residential segregation by income has increased over the past forty-five years. Bischoff and Reardon 
divide neighborhoods into six categories based on the relationship between their median family income 
and the median family income in the larger metropolitan area to which they belong. They find that, 
while 65 percent of families lived in middle-income neighborhoods in 1970, only 42 percent of families 
lived in middle-income neighborhoods in 2009 (see Figure 1).12 The number of families living in either 
poor or affluent neighborhoods, the two most extreme categories of neighborhood income, increased 
from 15 percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 2009.13 
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Figure 1
Residential contexts can affect economic opportunity through several channels. More integrated 
neighborhoods bring more diverse peer groups and role models and less exposure to violence and 
other environmental hazards “such as lead-based paint, vermin, and pollution.”14 Neighborhoods 
with more high-income members may also attract and sustain greater investments in public goods 
than neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. Each of these factors influences the life of children 
from an early age and has mobility implications.
Sharkey has conducted one of the most comprehensive reviews on how neighborhoods 
affect mobility. As he notes, only a few studies have examined the link between “measures of 
neighborhood economic status during childhood and adult economic status,” but most studies that 
do have established a correlation.15 Many observational studies instead explore the relationship 
between neighborhoods and intermediate predictors of adult outcomes, like school success and 
cognitive development. These studies also find clear links between neighborhood characteristics—
such as the presence of affluent neighbors, the concentration of neighborhood poverty, and rates 
of residential mobility—and childhood outcomes like high school dropout rates and scores on 
assessments of cognitive skills.16 
Sharkey’s own research implies a causal relationship between exposure to neighborhood violence 
and worse childhood outcomes. In one study, he found that preschool children had more difficulty 
controlling their impulses, paying attention, and scoring well on vocabulary and math tests when 
homicides had recently occurred near their homes. A more recent study found similar results 
for English test scores in New York City, particularly for black students who had been exposed 
to recent neighborhood violence.17 While Sharkey’s recent research deals with short-term 
neighborhood effects, he notes that studies typically conclude that “the effect of neighborhood 
disadvantage on cognitive and academic outcomes is more severe if disadvantage is persistent, 
experienced over long periods of a family’s history.”18 
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Proposed Solutions
Sharkey identifies three sets of strategies that can promote economic opportunity by combating 
residential segregation—reducing economic disadvantage directly, encouraging residential mobility, 
and investing in communities. Policies that address the most important and sustainable strategy—
reducing inequality and poverty—are discussed in detail in a later section of this paper, as the impact 
of these policies on both relative and absolute mobility is most apparent when considering the direct 
effects that inequality and poverty have on families.
Housing mobility programs represent a second approach to combating residential segregation and 
promoting economic opportunity. These programs represent an immediate opportunity for both 
relative and absolute mobility enhancement for millions of low-income children. Implementation of 
improvements to the Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV) program, one of three of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) major rental assistance programs, do not necessarily require 
new funding and can be undertaken without congressional action (we provide details on these policies 
below).
Several programs have offered a window into the potential effectiveness of housing vouchers and public 
housing options. The Gautreaux program, which begain in the 1970s in Chicago, is an early example. 
Under the program, about 7,000 participants were offered the chance to move to new neighborhoods.19 
About half of these participants moved to middle-income suburbs that were an average of 25 miles 
from their original homes, and the results for children were striking: they “attended better schools, were 
less likely to drop out before completing high school, received higher grades, and were more likely to 
attend college than those who remained in Chicago city neighborhoods. They also were more likely to be 
employed full time as adults, and to earn better wages, than those moving to locations within the city.”20
A more recent study from RAND also suggests that obtaining housing in low-poverty neighborhoods 
can have a substantial impact on economic opportunity. Schwartz exploited a natural experiment in 
Maryland’s Montgomery County that randomly assigned families to public housing developments and 
tracked students for seven years. She found that students whose families were assigned to the lowest-
poverty neighborhoods had test scores substantially higher than students who lived in higher-poverty 
neighborhoods.21 
Researchers have been hesitant to draw causal conclusions from the Gautreaux program because it lacked 
the features of a true experimental design,22 however, and evidence from Moving To Opportunity (MTO), a 
1994-initated random assignment study, paints a more complicated picture. MTO divided volunteer low-
income families living in assisted housing into three groups: a group that received housing vouchers that 
were conditional upon moving to a low-poverty neighborhood and remaining there for at least one year, 
a group that received housing vouchers with no strings attached, and a group that received no housing 
support through MTO (though some people in this group were still eligible for housing vouchers under 
other circumstances). While receiving vouchers and living in low-poverty neighborhoods seemed, on 
average, to yield positive mental and physical health benefits for women and girls, boys who moved into 
these neighborhoods experienced negative mental health outcomes. Additionally, families in low-poverty 
neighborhoods “generally did not experience economic gains for adults or educational gains for children.”23
At the same time, families in MTO did not necessarily stay in low-income neighborhoods very long, and 
the RAND study found that the positive effects for children of living in low-income neighborhoods “began 
to appear only in the students’ fifth year.”24 In addition, control group families in MTO also saw declines in 
neighborhood poverty and violent crime during the period studied, and students in experimental group 
families attended schools that, like control group schools, were segregated by income and race. Chetty 
finds in an alternative MTO analysis that “moving to [a] low-poverty census tract at [a] young age (<13) 
increases earnings in adulthood by 30%.”25
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The Chetty, Gautreaux, and RAND findings illustrate the potential benefit from an improved housing 
voucher program. Four low-cost changes to the HCV program recommended by Sard and Rice provide 
a promising framework. First, HUD should incentivize local and state housing agencies to increase 
the share of HCV recipients who live in low-poverty areas through evaluations, rules, and/or monetary 
rewards. Second, HUD should modify existing policies that discourage families from living in lower-
poverty areas; for example, HUD can “set its caps on rental subsidy amounts for smaller geographic 
areas than it now does [and] require agencies to identify available units in these lower-poverty 
communities and extend the search period for families seeking to make such moves.” Third, HUD 
should encourage unified program operations in metropolitan areas and eliminate other jurisdictional 
barriers that make it harder to help HCV recipients live in low-poverty neighborhoods. Fourth, state 
and local governments and housing agencies should assist families in the HCV program who wish 
to move to low-poverty areas, in part by prohibiting discrimination against voucher holders and by 
expanding access to transportation to and from low-poverty neighborhoods. At the very least, these 
changes should benefit the “quarter of a million children in the HCV program [who] live in…troubled 
neighborhoods despite the better options that a voucher should make available to them.”26 
Again, housing voucher improvements are more a low-cost, immediate strategy to improve economic 
opportunity for some children than a longer-term fix of the core problem. Even if HUD adopts these 
recommendations, significant numbers of children will remain stuck in neighborhoods with severely 
constrained access to opportunity. In fact, it’s not hard to imagine an adverse selection problem arising 
with these changes—that is, if more motivated households took advantage of the types of relocation 
policies suggested above, the families left behind could potentially be in even worse shape.
Thus, Sharkey’s third set of strategies to combat residential segregation are centered around place-
based investment, and like inequality and poverty reduction, we believe they have more long-term 
potential. Place-based investment strategies often overlap with inequality and poverty reduction 
strategies; for example, the New Hope program, a jobs program in Milwaukee that reduced family 
poverty and was associated with academic gains for children, also countered neighborhood poverty 
concentration by specifically targeting families in low-income neighborhoods.27 These sorts of anti-
poverty and anti-inequality efforts, discussed in more detail later in the paper, have the most long-term 
potential to reduce the effects of residential segregation. 
II. INCREASE ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION
The Problems
The discrepancies in academic achievement between high-income and low-income children, and 
between White students and Black and Latino students, are well-documented. The phrase “opportunity 
gap”28 describes how these discrepancies—in test score performance, high school dropout rates, and 
college completion rates, for example—are the product of a vastly different set of pathways available 
to students from different backgrounds. Reardon has documented that the gap in test score results 
between children at the 90th percentile of the income distribution and those at the 10th percentile of 
the income distribution has grown over time; the gap increased by roughly 40 to 50 percent between 
1974 and 2001, for example.29
Both in-school and out-of-school educational investment barriers present obstacles to mobility 
throughout students’ lifetimes. Because low-income parents don’t have as much time or money as 
wealthier parents, students from lower-income households rarely have equivalent access to enrichment 
opportunities from books, tutoring, computers, sports, and art lessons, for example. Between 2005 
and 2006, the wealthiest 20 percent of families spent about $8,900 per child on such opportunities; the 
poorest 20 percent of families were able to commit only $1,300 per student during the same year. 
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This 7-to-1 ratio was a substantial increase since the early 1970s (see Figure 2), when high-income 
parents spent about four times as much as low-income parents on enrichment activities, and is a likely 
product of increasing income inequality. Students from low-income backgrounds are also estimated to 
have spent 1,300 fewer hours in “novel contexts”—places different from home, school, or in the care 
of a daycare provider—by the time they reach age six.30 They hear fewer words than children in higher-
income families, likely in part because of the stressors faced by parents in poverty or near-poverty 
conditions, and typically have detectably slower-growing vocabularies by age three.31 
Figure 2
Insufficient investment in publicly-funded pre-school is another issue for low-income students. As 
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) recently noted, “[i]nequality in early child development 
is reflected in, and exacerbated by, differences in access to and utilization of early care and 
education programs by income and educational attainment.”32 While 68 percent of 3- and 4-year-
old children from families with reported incomes of at least $75,000 a year were enrolled in pre-
school or kindergarten in 2013, only 49 percent of same-age children from families making less 
than $40,000 were enrolled.33 
Underfunding is also a persistent feature of K-12 education, particularly in low-income 
neighborhoods. Overall, 35 states are providing less total state and local per pupil funding in 
the 2014-2015 school year than they did before the most recent recession, and fourteen of these 
states have cut per pupil funding by 10 percent or more. Federal aid to states is also down since 
2010; real Title I funding, which is dedicated to low-income schools, has declined by 10 percent 
during that time, and real special education funding is down 8 percent.34 These cuts are felt most 
harshly in schools that serve low-income students, which typically operate with far fewer resources 
than schools that serve wealthier student bodies.35 Inadequate funding restricts the ability of 
school districts to implement reforms that increase the likelihood of student success and mobility.
Finally, money issues also restrict college attendance and completion, which are both significantly 
more accessible to students from higher-income backgrounds. 80 percent of students born into 
the top income quartile (75th percentile and above) between 1979 and 1982 went on to enroll in 
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college, and 54 percent of these students completed college within six years of matriculation. For 
students in the bottom income quartile (25th percentile and below), on the other hand, only 29 
percent enrolled in college, and only 9 percent earned their degrees within six years.36 
These differences partially represent the accumulation of unequal opportunities over students’ lifetimes, 
but they are also influenced by rising college costs and the potential debt burden faced by low-income, 
college-going youth. In 2013, the mean debt-to-income ratio for the poorest 50 percent of households 
was 58 percent, a 32 percentage point increase since 1995; the same ratio for the wealthiest five 
percent of households was 8 percent in 1995 and remained 8 percent in 2013 (see Figure 3).37 Evidence 
suggests that debt deters low-income students from college attendance more than it discourages 
high-income students,38 and as Oliff, Palacios, Johnson, and Leachman summarize, the high levels of 
debt faced by low-income students “are associated with lower rates of homeownership among young 
adults; can create stresses that reduce the probability of graduation…; and reduce the likelihood that 
graduates with majors in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics will go on to graduate 
school.”39 
Figure 3
Proposed Solutions
Contrary to popular belief, studies generally find that schools contribute no more than about 33 
percent to the gaps in academic achievement between high- and low-income children, and that they 
may contribute substantially less to the gap.40 The primary drivers of the opportunity gap include 
some of the outside-of-school effects discussed elsewhere in this paper, including the early-life 
parental investment barriers covered in the preceding section. But while it isn’t a primary cause of 
increasing income inequality or poverty, there is a demonstrable wage premium for college-educated 
workers,41 and school-based approaches that improve academic outcomes and the likelihood of college 
completion are an important step on the pathway to increased relative and absolute mobility. For 
example, children born into the bottom income quintile who obtain a college degree are 7 percentage 
points more likely to become top quintile earners than children born into the same quintile who do 
not earn a college degree.42 While a college degree may in part be, like earnings, a byproduct of other 
factors that predispose certain children to a greater likelihood of success, education is also mobility-
enhancing in and of itself.
15
Publicly-funded, universal preschool is one intervention for which the supporting evidence is extremely 
clear. A 2013 meta-analysis of studies that analyzed the effects of 84 early childhood education (ECE) 
programs, including Head Start, found that ECE programs improved student test scores by an average 
of 0.35 standard deviations. As CEA explains, studies typically reveal significant long-term gains from 
ECE programs; Deming’s 2009 study of Head Start, for example, found that the program “increased 
high school graduation rates by 8.6 percentage points, increased college attendance rates by 6 
percentage points, and reduced non-participation (in either education or employment) rates by 7 
percentage points, with African-American participants experiencing the largest gains.”43 
In 2013, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a proposal that “would make pre-school free 
for children in families that make up to 200 percent of the poverty line while providing grants to families 
above that threshold based on a sliding scale that would cover between 30 and 95 percent of the cost.” 
The costs of such a program, or a more ambitious program to make pre-school free for everyone, would 
be non-negligible; CAP estimated that their proposal would cost $98 billion over 10 years.44 However, 
research suggests that the children who benefit from these investments “pay” for them later in life by 
generating both more tax revenues and lower public costs. CEA describes how “[r]esearchers estimate 
that the skills gains demonstrated in [high-quality pre-school programs] will lead to income gains of 
1.3 to 3.5 percent each year when children are adults…In the long run, these earnings gains translate 
into an increase in GDP of 0.16 to 0.44 percent.”45 Universal, publicly-funded pre-K is both a good 
investment and a tool to enhance and promote both relative and absolute mobility.
At the primary and secondary school levels, research suggests that adequate funding makes a 
difference for student outcomes; in fact, a new study by Jackson, Johnson, and Persico suggests that 
“a 10 percent increase in per-pupil spending each year for all twelve years of public school leads to 
0.27 more completed years of education, 7.25 percent higher wages, and a 3.67 percentage-point 
reduction in the annual incidence of adult poverty; effects are much more pronounced for children from 
low-income families.”46 There are a few channels through which more funding might boost student 
achievement, including but not limited to extended learning time, better facilities, more competitive 
teacher pay that facilitates recruitment and retention, reduced class sizes,47 greater investments in 
extracurricular activities, and expanded instructional coaching opportunities. More research is needed 
into these mechanisms and funding is not in and of itself a panacea, as the way funding is spent matters 
a great deal. Still, the evidence suggests that plugging school funding shortfalls and ensuring funding 
equity for low-income communities should be a top K-12 policy priority.48
While the policy pathway at the federal level includes increased funding for programs like Title I, 
Mitchell and Leachman offer a promising area for savings at the state level: criminal justice reforms. 
As discussed in the final section of this paper, policies that remedy criminal justice issues are an 
important part of the equality of opportunity toolbox in their own right. Yet these reforms, by reducing 
incarceration rates, can also help address cuts to education funding. “If states were still spending on 
corrections what they spent in the mid-1980s, adjusted for inflation,” write Mitchell and Leachman, 
“they would have about $28 billion more each year that they could choose to spend on more productive 
investments or a mix of investments and tax reductions.”49 Research indicates that increased state 
funding for education and a move away from funding schools through local property taxes can also 
improve funding equity between schools, which leads to better outcomes for students.50 
Policies that make college more affordable for students from low- and middle-income families are 
also important tools for promoting relative mobility, as studies have found “that need-based grant aid 
increases college enrollment among low- and moderate-income students and reduces their likelihood 
of dropping out.”51 In 2013, the Institute for College Access and Success issued a white paper detailing 
research-based policy recommendations that begin to accomplish this goal within the constraints of 
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the current system. For example, they suggest doubling the maximum Pell Grant, which despite recent 
increases “covers the lowest share of college costs since the start of the program.”52 Another proposal, 
from the Reimagining Aid Design and Delivery (RADD) Consortium for Higher Education Tax Reform, 
would simplify and better target tax-based aid, which is currently skewed towards well-off families, to 
reach students who need it most (see Figure 4 below).53 
Figure 4
The recent proposal to make two years of college free at all public institutions from Senator Bernie 
Sanders has even more potential. While Sanders’s proposal would cost $18 billion a year,54 this 
investment in educational opportunity, like the investment in early childhood education, would 
likely be well worth the cost.
III. STRENGTHEN THE SAFETY NET AND RAISE MARKET INCOMES TO PUT  
 CHILDREN ON A MORE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The Problems
While increased access to quality education and reduced residential segregation by income can 
clearly reduce inequality of opportunity, the biggest obstacle to inequality of opportunity is most 
likely low incomes and wealth levels themselves. Not only are low levels of economic resources 
one reason why these other barriers exist, but there are also unique opportunity constraints 
imposed by poverty, wage stagnation, and low net worth. 
The implication of this assertion is that all else equal, simply having more wealth affords one more 
opportunities of remaining in a privileged position. Findings from the Pew Economic Mobility 
Project that control for educational attainment underscore this point; children born into the top 
quintile of the income distribution who do not graduate from college are 2.5 times more likely 
to end up in the top quintile as adults as children born into the bottom quintile who do graduate 
college.55
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The correlation between household income as a child and eventual income as an adult is well-
established in the research. Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, for example, in a careful examination 
of federal income tax data, examine the link between a family’s percentile rank in income level and 
the eventual percentile rank in income level for the family’s children when they reach adulthood. 
Chetty et al. find that a 10 percentile point increase in family income rank as a child is, on average, 
associated with a 3.4 percentile point increase in income rank as an adult.56 Reeves and Howard 
also find evidence of a “glass floor” for children born into wealthy families, a level of income below 
which it is unlikely that such children will ever fall. Their work indicates that 43 percent “of children 
who remain in a higher-income household are of modest skill, and would be expected on the basis 
of skill to fall.”57
A growing literature also finds correlations between inequality of outcomes and inequality of 
opportunity, as Bradbury and Triest discuss in a careful review of the research. They describe how 
Corak’s work suggests that wealthier parents pass on advantages to their children both through 
monetary channels, like increased investment in enrichment opportunities, and nonmonetary channels, 
like social connections. Corak also submits that public policy plays a role in establishing the causal 
relationship between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity; the lack of public, universal 
health coverage in the United States, for example, may lead to reduced opportunity by subjecting low-
income children to more severe health shocks. The work of Brunori, Ferreira, and Peragine and Mitnick, 
Cumberworth, and Grusky similarly indicate a strong relationship between inequality of outcomes and 
inequality of opportunity. 
Bradbury and Triest themselves find that higher levels of income inequality are associated with 
less relative mobility. They also note that the percentage of parents in the middle class in a given 
“commuting zone” is “strongly positively associated” with the degree of relative mobility, as shown in 
Figure 5 below.58
Figure 5
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Contrary to Bradbury, Triest, Chetty, and others, Bloome finds no correlation between inequality of 
outcomes and inequality of opportunity across states.59 She does, however, acknowledge that increasing 
inequality has negative implications, regardless of its causal connection with relative mobility, because 
“the economic consequences of growing up rich or poor have risen.” Bradbury and Triest agree, noting 
that a “reason [that inequality of outcomes likely causes an increase in inequality of opportunity] is 
simply that the parents’ generation’s outcomes are very closely related to the children’s generation’s 
circumstances.”60
Our knowledge about precisely why growing up relatively poor reduces opportunity is still incomplete, 
but reasons likely vary from child to child and may range from less adequate nutrition to overcrowded 
and chaotic housing conditions, less medical attention, greater environmental hazards (such as lead 
poisoning from neglected paint or pipes), and (as previously noted) reduced access to extracurricular 
activities, adequately-funded schooling, and the kinds of neighborhoods associated with later success. 
One explanation in particular has been highlighted by recent research: poverty and near-poverty 
conditions likely expose low-income children to much higher levels of sustained, “toxic” stress 
than their higher income peers. The Center on the Developing Child at Harvard distinguishes toxic 
stress from “positive” stress and from “tolerable” stress, which everyone at some point experiences. 
Whereas positive stress describes a short-term elevation in heart rate and moderate increase in stress 
hormone levels in response to a brief stressor, tolerable stress and toxic stress arise in response to 
“more severe, longer-lasting difficulties.” The stress is tolerable if the exposure is time-limited and the 
person experiencing it has favorable life circumstances, as the brain and other organs can recover 
from exposure to extreme cortisol levels under these conditions. However, the stress becomes toxic 
“when a child experiences strong, frequent, and/or prolonged adversity—such as physical or emotional 
abuse, chronic neglect, caregiver substance abuse or mental illness, exposure to violence, and/or the 
accumulated burdens of family economic hardship.”61
A substantial body of evidence suggests that toxic stress negatively impacts the brain and long-term 
health outcomes of children in utero, during the earliest years of childhood, and into their teenage 
years. A study by Aizer, Stroud, and Buka, for example, found that children born during times of high 
maternal stress ended up with “a year less schooling, a verbal IQ score that [was] five points lower and a 
48 percent increase in the number of chronic [health] conditions” when compared to siblings who were 
born during less stressful times. These maternal stress level differences were typically related to family 
income.62 
Similarly, Ziol-Guest, Duncan, Kalil, and Boyce found “that low income, particularly in very early 
childhood (between the prenatal and second year of life), is associated with increases in early-adult 
hypertension, arthritis, and limitations on activities of daily living. Moreover, these relationships and 
particularly arthritis partially account for the associations between early childhood poverty and adult 
productivity as measured by adult work hours and earnings.”63 Research by Hanson et al. indicates 
that, over time, poverty likely leads to a reduction in gray matter—“tissue critical for processing of 
information and execution of actions”—in the brains of children who experience it.64 Toxic stress 
continues to reduce opportunities as children get older; for example, research by Evans and colleagues 
found that “working memory in early adulthood (i.e., age 17) deteriorated in direct relation to the 
number of years…children lived in poverty (from birth through age 13).” As the researchers noted, 
this result was not observed for all children in poverty, but only for those children who experienced 
the “chronically elevated physiological stress (as measured between ages 9 and 13)” that “usually 
accompanies poverty,” suggesting that toxic stress was the causal mechanism for their results.65 In 
response to the overwhelming research that links toxic stress to childhood and later-life outcomes, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics began to urge policymakers to begin to address this issue head-on in a 
formal 2012 statement.66
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Sherman, Parrott, and Trisi have documented a high incidence of conditions that may add to toxic 
stress in poor and near-poor households; for households with cash incomes between 100 percent 
and 200 percent of the poverty line, for example, 45 percent experienced at least one of the 
following stressors during 2011: difficulty affording adequate food, overcrowded housing, late 
rent or mortgage, and/or having utilities cut off. An even larger percentage of households below 
the poverty line, 58 percent, experienced at least one of these conditions, while the percentage 
dropped to 17 percent for households above 200 percent of the poverty line.67 Brooks-Gunn et 
al.’s research, which found that “infants born into low-income families experienced nearly three 
times more risk factors than their middle-income counterparts by the time they were toddlers,” 
highlights the grossly unequal exposure to early life stressors affecting low-income children 
(low-income children experienced seven times as many risk factors as affluent children). As Evans, 
Brooks-Gunn, and Klebanov note, “[b]eing born into early poverty often means exposure to many 
more physical and psychosocial risk factors.”68 
Proposed Solutions
The research on toxic stress and the relationships between poverty, inequality, and relative 
mobility suggests that policies that reduce poverty, wage and income stagnation, and inequality 
directly hold considerable promise for promoting equality of opportunity. First, these policies 
help improve absolute living standards, and thus have the potential to offset the spate of 
negative “direct effects” discussed above. Policies that reduce poverty and inequality also have 
the potential to improve neighborhood quality, another way in which they can enhance relative 
mobility.
There are two approaches to raising the incomes and thus the opportunities of those currently 
facing steep mobility barriers. First, the government provides resources to low-income families 
through safety net programs that boost both the consumption of and the investments in low-
income families. As we show, there is good evidence of the extent to which these programs help 
boost opportunity, and thus ensuring their fiscal health must be a key goal of the opportunity 
agenda.
Second, interventions in the primary distribution of wages and incomes, otherwise known as 
“market outcomes,” are also essential for ensuring that working families have a better chance 
to claim a larger share of the growth they’re helping to produce. This strategy is an essential 
complement to the safety net strategy noted above.
Safety net programs: These programs, which fit in the first category of solutions outlined above, 
already play an important role in inequality- and poverty-reduction. Trisi has shown that safety 
net programs, in sum, lifted 39 million people out of poverty in 2013. As he notes, Census 
Supplemental Poverty Measure “data highlight the effectiveness of cash assistance such as 
Social Security, non-cash benefits such as rent subsidies and SNAP (formerly food stamps), and 
tax credits for working families like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).” Without government 
assistance, 28.1 percent of all Americans and 27.5 percent of Americans under age 18 would be 
in poverty, but after taking into account the effects of taxes and transfers, the percentages drop 
to 15.5 percent and 16.4 percent, respectively (see Figure 6).69 Similarly, analysis of CBO data 
shows that federal taxes and transfers reduced inequality by 26 percent in 2011.70 While absolute 
levels of poverty and inequality remain high, they are much lower than they would be in the 
absence of the safety net.
20
Figure 6
High quality research into these interventions, much of which is longitudinal and quasi-experimental, 
comparing outcomes of adults who participated in the programs as kids to adults who did not, 
documents their long-run positive impact.71 Research on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and 
Child Tax Credit (CTC), food assistance programs like SNAP, and Medicaid provides particularly 
compelling evidence for this point.
As Marr, Huang, Sherman, and DeBot note in a comprehensive look at the research on the EITC 
and CTC, working family tax credits appear to improve outcomes at virtually every stage of life. For 
example, some research has suggested that mothers who receive greater benefits from the EITC 
are more likely to receive prenatal care and less likely to drink or smoke during pregnancy than 
mothers who receive a smaller EITC benefit. Marr et al. explain that infants born to mothers who 
were likely eligible for the largest increases in EITC benefits during the 1990s “had the greatest 
improvements in a number of birth indicators, such as fewer incidences of low weight births and 
premature births,” factors likely to enhance future mobility prospects. The EITC has been linked to 
higher test scores for children in the year of a family’s receipt, and the added income from both the 
EITC and the CTC has been tied to lasting test score increases for students. Receiving a larger EITC 
during childhood has also been associated with an increased likelihood of attending and graduating 
from college (both skills gains and greater affordability72 seem to drive this effect). Perhaps most 
strikingly, Duncan, Ziol-Guest, and Kalil have found, as Marr et al summarize, that “[f]or children in 
low-income families, a $3,000 increase in family income (in 2005 dollars) between a child’s prenatal 
year and fifth birthday is associated with an average 17 percent increase in annual earnings and an 
additional 135 hours of work when the children become adults, compared to similar children whose 
families do not receive the added income.”73  
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Figure 7
A study by Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond found similar results for food stamps (SNAP). 
The authors studied the program in its nascent years, beginning in the 1960s, and compared the 
outcomes of disadvantaged children born into families with food stamp access to disadvantaged 
children whose families were unable to benefit from food stamps. When poor, pregnant mothers 
and their children had access to food stamp benefits, children were 6 percent less likely to 
experience stunted growth, 5 percent less likely to experience heart disease, 16 percent less 
likely to experience obesity, and 18 percent more likely to graduate high school (see Figure 
8 below). Women were also more likely to find work and avoid poverty once they reached 
adulthood.74
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Figure 8
As Broaddus argues, the first study “to examine the long-term economic impacts of additional years 
of Medicaid eligibility” also suggests that the story is the same with Medicaid. The study found an 
association between more years of Medicaid eligibility and lower mortality, higher wages (among women), 
increased likelihood of college attendance, and a greater tax contribution. These results are consistent 
with other research that has found that “enrolling in Medicaid improves access to health care and reduces 
medically related financial hardships[, and] that people more likely to be eligible for prenatal and infant 
care through Medicaid were healthier in young adulthood.”75 Direct aid to the poor appears to be a 
“trampoline” when it comes to later life outcomes, significantly boosting relative mobility.76
Maintaining these programs and strengthening them where appropriate, thus sustaining and enhancing 
their impact on relative mobility, is in many cases straightforward. In terms of Medicaid, the solution is 
simple: states should adopt the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. The federal government pays 
the full cost of the expansion for the first three years and at least 90 percent of the cost on a permanent 
basis thereafter. In fact, states that have adopted the expansion expect their Medicaid spending to grow 
more slowly than states that have not yet adopted it.77
In the case of the EITC and CTC, the path forward is also clear. Key provisions of these working family 
tax credits, introduced in 2009, are set to expire at the end of 2017; this expiration would push “16 
million people—including 8 million children—into or deeper into poverty.”78 Congress should make these 
provisions permanent. Additionally, strengthening the EITC for childless workers who currently benefit 
very little from the credit would not only raise their incomes, but would also have the potential to facilitate 
their employment and reduce their incarceration rates, the benefits of which are discussed in more detail 
below. Both President Obama and Representative Paul Ryan have adopted a similar proposal that would 
raise the EITC benefit $670 for a childless worker at the poverty line, and $520 for a full-time, minimum 
wage childless worker.79  
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A recent report from the Children’s Defense Fund (CDF)80 provides a useful simulation of how much 
amped up versions of these sorts of ideas can diminish poverty. The Urban Institute estimated for 
CDF the impact on child poverty of nine proposals, including a higher EITC for low-income families 
with children, making the CTC fully refundable,81 and a 30 percent increase in SNAP benefits. It found 
that these three proposals combined would have cost $43.8 billion and lifted 4.1 million children out 
of poverty in 2010.82 Taken together, the full spate of CDF proposals83 are estimated to reduce child 
poverty by 60 percent. 
Brookings researchers Sawhill and Karpilow also report on their “Social Genome Project,” an evaluation 
of the impact of home instruction for new parents, highly quality preschool, and a variety of education 
initiatives.84 They develop “elasticities” from these programs—the quantitative extent to which child 
outcomes are affected by application of the interventions—and apply them to a representative data set 
of children using “a life cycle model to track their progress from the earliest years through school and 
beyond.” 
Sawhill and Karpilow argue that these “interventions can close over 70 percent of the gap between 
more and less advantaged children in the proportion who end up middle class by middle age.” While 
such a quantitatively large impact is likely harder to achieve than their simulations suggest (e.g., their 
summative approach may overstate combined gains from the different interventions), the idea that 
multiple interventions throughout the life cycle can “improve social mobility and enhance the lifetime 
incomes of less advantaged children” is an important one.
Resources to support safety net expansion: Many of the ideas suggested above involve significant 
resources beyond those of the current system (for example, President Obama’s plan to expand the EITC 
to childless adults would cost $60 billion over 10 years). While it is beyond our scope to elaborate a 
granular budget, we do believe it is necessary to briefly address this issue, especially since we can do so 
in a way that is consistent with the theme of increasing opportunity.
For example, President Obama’s most recent budget proposes to end “step-up basis” for wealthy 
taxpayers.85 Step-up basis is a tax subsidy through which individuals can eliminate their entire 
capital gains tax liability by holding assets until death. Not only is this subsidy economically 
inefficient, as Marr and Huang explain, but since “about three-quarters of the benefit of the 
preferential rates for capital gains and dividends (which also are taxed at a lower top rate than 
ordinary income) flowed to the top 1 percent of households” in 2013, step-up basis also likely 
entrenches immobility at the top of the income scale.86 The White House proposal for ending 
step-up basis and raising the capital gains rate to 28 percent, the same rate enacted under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 with President Reagan’s support, would raise $232 billion over 10 years.87 
A second and related approach would be to strengthen the estate tax, which only applies to 
assets exceeding $5.43 million for individual estates and twice that for couples. While the top 
marginal tax rate on estates is 40 percent, the high exemption threshold, various deductions, 
and loopholes mean that the very few estates that were taxable at all owed only 16.6 percent of 
their assets in tax in 2013. Changes such as reducing the individual exemption threshold to $3.5 
million and increasing the top rate to 45 percent would raise $138 billion88 over ten years to fund 
other mobility-enhancing efforts. Like ending step-up basis, they would also reduce some of the 
immobility that results from the preferential tax treatment of large inheritances. In fact, NYU Law 
Professor Lily Batchelder believes that “[t]he current estate tax system is the most important 
mechanism by which the fiscal system mitigates the effects of inheritances on economic disparities 
and intergenerational mobility.”89
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Strategies to improve market outcomes for low- and moderate-income households: The safety net 
and limitations on the transfer of exorbitant wealth only go so far. Some of the most important tools 
to combat poverty and inequality thus target the pre-tax and -transfer earnings of low- and moderate 
income families. These tools are essential in the fight for equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, 
as noted, stagnant wages for parents translate into an unequal starting gate for children, with lasting 
impacts on opportunity. Second, both relative and absolute mobility depend on the availability of good 
job opportunities when children grow up and eventually enter the labor market.
Raising the federal minimum wage, which is not currently adjusted for inflation and has declined 
significantly in real terms since the 1960s, is one proven way to improve outcomes for low-wage 
workers, many of whom are parents (about 27 percent of those affected by the proposed federal 
increase noted below).90 As Bernstein and Parrott have documented, while opponents of the policy 
typically stress its unintended consequences of pricing low-wage workers out of the labor market, 
most of the research finds that increases in the minimum wage achieve their “goal of boosting 
the earnings of low-wage workers, most of whom really need the extra resources, with virtually no 
budgetary costs and few unintended consequences.”91 
The Urban Institute’s analysis of the CDF proposal discussed above suggests that a small minimum 
wage increase to $9.30 an hour in 2010, and an increase in the tipped minimum wage to 70 percent 
of that amount ($6.51), would have lifted 400,000 children out of poverty and increased earnings for 
11.4 million workers in families with children by an average of around $1,500. In addition, the Urban 
Institute estimates that, because affected families would owe more in taxes and qualify for fewer 
benefits, this proposal would have resulted in $15.2 billion combined in savings and additional 
revenues from these workers.92 
In 2013, congressional Democrats introduced a proposal to phase in a national minimum of $10.10 
an hour over three years, afterwards indexing it to inflation. But as that proposal failed to pass and 
inflation has further eroded the real value of the minimum wage, Senate Democrats have offered 
a new proposal to lift the national wage floor to $12 by 2020 and subsequently index its value to 
the median wage. Several cities, including Seattle, Oakland, and Chicago, have also raised their 
minimums, often to higher levels than in both federal proposals. We consider both the new federal 
proposal and ambitious local increases to be positive developments, as they provide researchers 
with opportunities to continue to study the effects of minimum wage increases, account for 
price and wage variation across the country, and simultaneously set an important baseline labor 
standard that keeps low-wage workers above the poverty line.
Relatedly, strengthening collective bargaining rights could also reduce inequality, thus promoting 
relative and absolute mobility, by helping workers to negotiate higher wages and reclaim a fairer 
share of productivity gains.93
The full employment agenda is another important way to promote equality of opportunity. As 
Baker and Bernstein have shown, full employment labor markets, which are characterized by a 
tight match between the number of job seekers and the number of available jobs, are one of the 
surest ways to give families the opportunity to raise their living standards; in turn, full employment 
labor markets are one of the surest ways to work towards a more level playing field for children.94 
As a forthcoming paper from Wilson suggests, the benefits of full employment labor markets are 
particularly important for black families.95
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The full employment agenda has many components, including stimulative fiscal policy, growth-oriented 
monetary policy, public investment, attention to the trade deficit and manufacturing jobs, a subsidized 
and targeted job creation program, worksharing, apprenticeships and on-the-job training, and improved 
labor standards. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Full Employment Project has partnered with 
leading scholars to develop proposals in several of these areas.96 
For example, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Emergency Fund (TANF EF) provides a 
model for a scaled-up subsidized jobs program. Subsidized jobs programs can provide immediate 
income assistance to people who need it, especially during difficult economic times; as noted above, 
increased incomes for families with children have been linked to better long-term outcomes for kids. 
These programs may also increase “employment and earnings after the subsidized placement ends;” 
while the evidence is less conclusive that subsidized jobs programs accomplish this goal, the most 
recent study of TANF EF suggests that programs targeted to the long-term unemployed can.97 As 
Pavetti notes, Elizabeth Lower-Basch from CLASP “has recommended98 offsetting the costs of a new 
subsidized employment program by eliminating the Work Opportunity Tax Credit [WOTC].” The WOTC 
“provides more than a billion dollars per year in tax breaks to businesses that hire members of certain 
disadvantaged groups,” despite the fact that research suggests it is ineffective; redirecting the funds 
towards a subsidized jobs program would likely do more to promote equality of opportunity.
Last99 but certainly not least, policies that address criminal justice issues are another essential part of 
the opportunity toolbox, in no small part because criminal justice issues adversely affect not just the 
incarcerated population, but over 70 million Americans who have a “conviction or arrest history that can 
show up on a routine background check for employment.”100 The portion of these people who spend 
time behind bars are at a particular disadvantage; as Mitchell and Leachman note: “A Pew study found 
that men with a previous criminal conviction worked roughly nine fewer weeks, and earned 40 percent 
less, each year than otherwise similar non-offenders…The study also found that men’s total earnings 
by age 48 are less than half among men who have been incarcerated than among comparable men 
who have not been incarcerated.” In addition, prison policies have a substantial negative impact on the 
families of incarcerated people, increasing poverty for other household members, including children, 
as well for people who have spent time behind bars.  There is even evidence that prison policies 
destabilize neighborhoods and reduce economic outcomes for non-incarcerated adults in counties with 
rising incarceration rates.101 These policies are a clear drag on both relative and absolute mobility.
Mitchell and Leachman recommend four policies that can reduce the negative effects of 
incarceration rates. First, states can “[d]ecriminalize certain activities and reclassify certain low-
level felonies” for offenses like marijuana possession. Second, states should “[e]xpand the use of 
alternatives to prison for non-violent crimes and divert people with mental health or substance 
abuse issues away from the criminal justice system altogether.” Third, states should “[r]educe 
the length of prison terms and parole/probation periods.” This reform includes re-examining 
sentencing laws. Finally, states should “restrict the use of prison for technical violations of parole/
probation.”102 Research also suggests that programs aimed at educating people while they are in 
prison have considerable value.103
Reforms to both FBI and private background checks104 and fair-chance hiring practices are also 
necessary to reduce the negative effects of criminal records on individuals and their families’ 
future outcomes. “Ban the box” is one such reform that is currently gaining momentum. The “box” 
in “ban the box” refers to a checkbox on many job applications that asks about an applicant’s 
criminal record. This fair chance hiring practice is about excluding this question from the initial 
application, and only allowing employers to conduct such background checks after they have 
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developed impressions of candidates based on their qualifications, skills, and interviews. By moving 
this background check to the end of the process, “ban the box” policies prevent employers from 
consciously or subconsciously discriminating against applicants with a criminal record.
Early evidence on “ban the box” is encouraging. Minneapolis found that postponing the background 
check until after a conditional offer of employment “resulted in more than half of applicants with a 
conviction being hired.” In Durham, the employment rate for the affected population quadrupled, 
and in Atlanta, affected individuals made up “10 percent of city hires between March and October of 
2013.”105
Initiatives like “ban the box” are important on the one hand because of their direct effects on relative 
mobility; for example, men with criminal records in the lowest quintile of the income distribution are 
about twice as likely to stay there as men without criminal records, in part because of the employment 
discrimination they face.106 But these initiatives are also important for reducing inequality of opportunity, 
like other policies that reduce inequality of outcomes and poverty, because they improve the lives of 
children in affected families. Without policies that strengthen the safety net, improve labor market 
prospects, and reduce the damaging effects of the criminal justice system, the meritocratic ideal will 
continue to be a pipe dream.
CONCLUSION
Evidence indicates that poverty and inequality—in neighborhoods, educational access, and the labor 
market—limit opportunities for far too many Americans. While access to high levels of both relative and 
absolute mobility is currently elusive, however, a set of policy solutions that address poverty, inequality, 
and their consequences can remedy this issue. 
Changes to housing voucher policy and increases in the number of vouchers would lean against the 
trend towards more residential segregation and reduce the environmental hazards that low-income 
children often encounter. Access to pre-K and kindergarten, equitably-funded and supported primary 
and secondary schools, and low-cost postsecondary educational experiences can help narrow the gap 
in college completion between low-income and high-income children. Most importantly, policies that 
directly address the effects of inequality and poverty by strengthening the safety net and promoting 
full employment, for example, are likely to have the largest impact. Policies that improve the living 
conditions and job prospects of people in lower-income communities promote absolute mobility by 
definition and enhance relative mobility by putting children from different communities on a less uneven 
playing field.
Our biggest barrier to economic opportunity for all Americans is neither structural, budgetary, nor 
evidentiary—it is political. Research suggests several clear ways to begin to combat this problem, and it 
is incumbent upon us to muster the political willpower to do so.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite the absence of cooperation and consensus in Washington, widespread agreement has 
emerged that federal policy should focus on expanding opportunity. The goal calls for an agenda 
to increase economic growth rates in order to move everyone up. But even with a rising tide that 
lifts all boats, policies to expand opportunity must help more low-income children transcend their 
origins and make it into the middle class. The agenda outlined here is addressed to this second 
task: increasing the upward mobility of poor children. 
“Opportunity” means that one’s birth circumstances do not impede the pursuit of one’s American 
dream. Today, children raised in poverty have only a 40 percent chance of making it into the middle 
class as adults. Moving more poor children up is a moral imperative for the nation. But it is not 
obvious how to do that, and past approaches have failed.
Some proposals offered today are likely to prove equally unsuccessful because they misdiagnose 
the problem of immobility as stemming from rising income inequality and because they presume 
that what we have tried before will work if we just fund it more generously. A successful program 
for improving opportunity will take seriously how little we know about how to achieve that goal. 
It will recognize that different actors in efforts to help the poor have particular strengths that 
are suitable for specific roles. Increasing upward mobility will require acknowledging that simple 
financial incentives are often more effective than planned social programs, and that ill-designed 
safety-net programs can do as much or more to impede mobility as they do to promote it.
The opportunity agenda elaborated in this paper would promote upward mobility without 
increasing deficits by:
• Creating an Opportunity, Evidence, and Innovation Office (OEIO) in the White House to fund 
and evaluate hundreds of local mobility experiments and an Opportunity Advisory Commission 
(OAC) to make budgeting recommendations to Congress. These bodies would help discover 
and promote successful local approaches to expand opportunity and to dismantle ineffective 
federal programs that waste taxpayer dollars;
• Supporting through the OEIO a number of specific innovative and promising approaches to 
expanding opportunity. Among these would be early-childhood interventions, reorganization of 
high schools with high drop-out rates, and vocation-oriented learning communities within high 
schools;
• Sending a dozen safety-net programs to the states to promote experimentation and localization 
while requiring work and time limits for most—but not all—beneficiaries;
• Incentivizing work by reforming the Earned Income Tax Credit into an expanded work subsidy 
available to all low-income workers;
• Incentivizing delayed, planned, and marital childbearing by making the Child Tax Credit much 
more generous to married parents without making it less generous to single parents;
• Reforming the Social Security Disability Insurance program to promote work among able-
bodied men and women while continuing to support impaired men and women; and
• Providing the legal clarification and guidelines to spark the creation of investor markets 
to finance higher education, hold schools and programs accountable, and support new 
competitors to incumbent colleges and universities. 
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INTRODUCTION
Washington is not known as “Consensus City.” Yet the last few years have seen the emergence of widespread 
agreement across the ideological spectrum that economic opportunity should be at the center of federal 
policymaking. These days, it doesn’t matter if you’re on the left, on the right, or in the center; the direction 
that matters is up.
A modern opportunity agenda should have two goals. First, it should seek to increase upward mobility into 
the middle class among poor children. This will be the topic of the current paper. Second, an opportunity 
agenda should try to make more families more prosperous, wherever they start out and wherever they end up 
in the ranks as adults. Elaborating a growth agenda is left as a task for the future.
Our safety-net policies have succeeded in reducing poverty to a greater extent than is often appreciated.1 
But they have failed to increase the upward mobility of poor children—and through their work, marriage, and 
savings disincentives, these policies may even have prevented upward mobility. Nor have federal policies 
related to early-childhood; to primary, secondary, and postsecondary education; or to workforce development 
proved effective at moving low-income children into the middle class.
It is tempting to conclude that the federal government should get out of the business of mobility promotion, 
or that it should do nothing more than dismantle counterproductive policies. But anyone so tempted should 
first ask a fundamental question: What do we owe poor children who do not choose the circumstances into 
which they are born?
Rather than shrug and lament that there’s nothing we can do, it is worth persisting and considering that 
perhaps the problem is how we have tried to increase mobility in the past. Yuval Levin, one of today’s 
foremost conservative intellectuals, has put it well:
The overwhelming fact about [the nation’s] half century of intense and costly efforts to combat 
entrenched poverty is that they have not worked.... That means we do not have an answer that can 
be put into effect using the resources and power of the government. Rather, those resources and 
that power can enable experimentation with different approaches by different public and private 
providers of services and aid throughout the country.... Experimentation is what you do when you do 
not know the answer.2
There remains a moral obligation to poor children to experiment—to leverage the federal government’s 
strengths so that the nation may discover how to expand opportunity.
The opportunity agenda proposed here is based on four principles. First, an opportunity agenda must reflect 
epistemological modesty—“the knowledge of how little we know and can know.”3 We lack the knowledge 
necessary to rank-order specific barriers to upward mobility in terms of importance, to order by effectiveness 
policy solutions addressing any one barrier, and to rank these policies in terms of political feasibility. We 
especially lack the knowledge required to identify the optimal set of proposals that simultaneously account 
for these three dimensions. The proposals below acknowledge this problem by promoting state and local 
experimentation to affect mobility-enhancing behavior and to spend safety-net dollars in a way that better 
facilitates mobility. 
Second, an opportunity agenda should leverage the strengths of different types of actors. The principle of 
subsidiarity calls for interventions to occur at the smallest and most local level that is practical. The proposals 
here emphasize state and local roles, where knowledge specific to particular communities is greatest. But they 
also envision clear responsibilities at the federal level. The federal government would fund state and local 
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experimentation to ensure that mobility promotion is a national priority, and it would facilitate knowledge 
transfers between states and localities. The safety net would also continue to be largely financed through 
federal spending, ensuring that poor states are as able as others to support families at the bottom and that 
the safety net remains robust during economic recessions. The proposals also rely more expansively on 
private markets, where they are likely to be more effective than government policy.
A third principle is that clear financial incentives rather than social programs may be the most successful 
means available to government—especially at the federal level—for changing behaviors that impede mobility. 
The policies here eschew programs to increase work and marriage and reduce out-of-wedlock childbearing in 
favor of financial carrots and sticks that steer people toward such mobility-promoting behavior.
Finally, the opportunity agenda here is based on the principle that government programs often have 
unintended consequences that impede upward mobility. In some regards, government should be smaller 
rather than bigger, less generous rather than more so, if it seeks to enhance mobility.
As will be seen, these principles derive from evidence about what has and has not worked in the past and 
about what has and has not impeded the mobility of poor children. But the agenda here does not pretend to 
know definitively what will work in the future. We need to try something new.
THE STATE OF UPWARD MOBILITY IN AMERICA TODAY
A straightforward way to assess upward mobility rates is to divide adults into fifths based on their household 
income and to do the same based on their household income growing up. In a world in which family 
background bears no relationship to where children end up, 20 percent of adults who were raised in the 
poorest fifth of families would remain in the poorest fifth of adults, 20 percent would end up in the next-
poorest fifth, and so on, so that 20 percent would end up in each fifth of the adult income distribution. The 
same would be true of adults who grew up in the middle class or who had affluent parents.
In reality, about 40 percent of children who grow up in the poorest fifth of families have incomes in 
adulthood that place them in the bottom fifth. In other words, remaining “stuck at the bottom” is twice as 
likely as it would be if family background didn’t matter. Less than 40 percent of poor children make it into 
the middle fifth or higher as adults—a figure that would be 60 percent if family background were irrelevant.4 
Source: Author’s computations from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
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The evidence suggests that there has been remarkably little change in upward mobility over the 
past three generations.5 Equally surprising, while past research on income and earnings mobility has 
indicated that the U.S. has less upward mobility than our peer countries, new evidence suggests that we 
may have upward earnings mobility rates no worse than Sweden or Canada and not much worse than 
the other Scandinavian countries.6 Occupational mobility rates in the U.S. have also been comparable 
with those in other countries.7 
Source: Author’s computations from the National Longitudinal Surveys.
In the telling of many observers, however, upward mobility is uniquely crippled in America and 
becoming more so, largely because of rising income inequality. The appendix of this report 
explores these questions. It finds ample reason to think that mobility could remain unchanged in 
the next generation. It also finds little support for the view that economic inequality is an important 
factor affecting upward mobility, and the agenda proposed below reflects this perspective.
There are many other inequalities between rich and poor children besides income disparities; the 
ultimate sources of income inequality are likely to also be important sources of immobility. They are 
likely to be similar today as in the past, which is consistent with flat immobility in the presence of 
great societal and economic change.
The seven proposals below are premised on the likelihood that the deeper sources of immobility 
that also underlie income inequality are of fundamental importance. To an extent greater than 
most researchers are willing to admit, we do not have nearly enough knowledge to know what the 
most important sources of immobility are, let alone what the most effective ways to combat them 
are. The proposals here acknowledge this ambiguity. They seek to discover effective mobility-
promoting programs, to extend the lessons of past safety-net overhauls that appear likely to be 
mobility-increasing, and to try out a new approach to financing higher education that would inject 
accountability into postsecondary schools.
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PROPOSAL 1: WAGE WAR ON IMMOBILITY THROUGH AN OPPORTUNITY, 
EVIDENCE, AND INNOVATION OFFICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY 
COMMISSION
A HISTORY OF CENTRALIZED, INEFFECTIVE, AND UNACCOUNTABLE SOCIAL 
PROGRAMS
One approach to increasing opportunity is to design social programs to directly intervene in the lives of 
parents or children in order to change their skills, behavior, values, or attitudes. Most obviously, public 
primary and secondary schooling is intended to develop child knowledge and skills that will pay off in 
adulthood. Unfortunately, we know astonishingly little about how to increase the upward mobility of 
low-income children through social programs.8 It is not difficult to understand why. For decades, we 
have funded programs micromanaged from Washington, based on uniquely successful local efforts. 
These federal programs have almost invariably proved unable to replicate the success of the original 
initiative on a national scale. We rarely have evaluated these programs rigorously—and when we have, 
they routinely (on the order of nine out of ten times) have shown little to no impact on outcomes related 
to opportunity.9 We then have failed to hold unsuccessful programs accountable by eliminating them.
PRIORITIZING UPWARD MOBILITY WHILE DEMANDING RESULTS
A nation committed to expanding opportunity would devote much more attention and resources to 
discovering what local strategies successfully change the skills, behaviors, and values of disadvantaged 
children and their parents. Fortunately, under the Obama administration’s Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), a transformation of opportunity-promotion efforts in the direction of evidence-based 
policymaking has begun to take hold.10 The proposal here would propel this transformation further.
Specifically, it would create an Opportunity, Evidence, and Innovation Office (OEIO) within the White 
House and an independent congressional agency, the Opportunity Advisory Commission (OAC), to 
advise Congress on mobility policy. The idea for an OEIO draws on Brookings Institution senior fellow 
Richard Reeves’s clarion call for an Office of Opportunity to measure mobility and progress toward 
increasing it and to assess policy proposals for their impact on mobility.11 But the office proposed here 
would have three other responsibilities.
First, and most important, the office would fund and evaluate an array of demonstration projects and 
other efforts at the state and local levels. Currently, a number of programs across the government fund 
demonstrations, award competitive grants, or provide targeted funding to institutions for specific mobility-
related purposes. Most of them would be moved into the OEIO—in particular, the Social Innovation 
Fund (SIF, currently in the Corporation for National and Community Service), the Investing in Innovation 
Fund (i3, currently in the Department of Education), the School Improvement Grants initiative (also in 
the Department of Education), and the Workforce Innovation Fund (Department of Labor). The Obama 
administration’s Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, which birthed the SIF and i3 programs, 
has not been very active in this area since, and it would be displaced by the OEIO.12
But the OEIO budget for funding demonstrations would be substantially higher than the combined 
sum of the various programs that exist today. The proposal here would spend $20 billion every 
year to fund and evaluate hundreds of state and local demonstrations and projects. In so doing, it 
would operationalize the recommendation of entrepreneur and social scientist Jim Manzi that the 
federal government commit to the widespread use of randomized controlled trials to evaluate policy 
experiments and base policy priorities on evidence.13
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Within the OEIO, different grant-making programs would rely on different approaches. For instance, 
today’s SIF leverages private contributions and nongovernmental grant-makers to fund nonprofit 
organizations via public dollars matched by nongovernment sources. Its Pay for Success program 
awards grants to intermediaries for the purpose of structuring “social impact bond” arrangements. 
Social impact bonds are a funding model in which private funds are secured for some public purpose 
and bondholders are repaid contingent on the funded activity producing defined benefits and public 
savings. The current Investing in Innovation Fund awards competitive grants to school districts and 
nonprofits working with them to improve student outcomes. It relies on three tiers of funding to support 
proposals with varying levels of evidence underlying the activities to be funded.
Importantly, the OEIO evaluation efforts would not simply identify whether certain approaches “work” 
but would identify, within a given approach to mobility promotion, what the grantees that are successful 
or unsuccessful do differently. A model for this kind of research is provided by Harvard economist 
Roland Fryer, who has intensively studied what successful charter schools do.14
The second responsibility of the OEIO would be to work with OMB to promote evidence-based 
policymaking in existing programs run by federal agencies. To this end, the OEIO would produce 
reports highlighting the evidence in favor of or against different approaches and specific programs. 
The efforts of the OEIO and OMB on this front would be strengthened by improved integration of and 
access to data sources across the federal government. A bill introduced last year by Congressman Paul 
Ryan and Senator Patty Murray would create a commission to explore this issue, which would make 
recommendations on ways to better measure the outcomes of federal policies and to evaluate them.15
Third, the OEIO would provide information to policymakers, organizations, and social entrepreneurs 
about promising and unpromising approaches to expanding opportunity, and it would create 
opportunities for these stakeholders to learn from one another’s work. Most of the responsibilities 
of the Institute of Education Sciences, which conducts and funds research on education policy 
effectiveness and disseminates the results, would be moved into the OEIO, and the activities of this 
group would be expanded to address mobility-related policy areas outside education. Through reports 
and conferences, the office would explore mobility-related policies where there is limited scope for 
federal involvement, including those related to occupational licensing, residential zoning, sentencing 
and incarceration, and concentrated poverty.
The OAC would focus on evaluating for Congress existing and future federal programs that ostensibly 
seek to increase upward mobility. The OAC would make recommendations to Congress, via annual 
reports, about which programs should be eliminated, cut, expanded, or adopted. It would rely 
on existing evidence from outside and within government (including the results of the OEIC’s 
demonstration projects and its other informational resources). The OAC could identify programs that 
were not being rigorously evaluated and for which little relevant evidence exists and recommend the 
passage of legislation to impose stronger evaluation requirements on such programs.
Funding for the OEIO and the OAC would come from part of the savings from reforming the Social 
Security Disability Insurance program (see below).16 Over the long run, it is probable that the OEIO 
and the OAC would reduce federal spending by providing the justification for cutting and eliminating 
ineffective programs. Those who would balk at the $20 billion OEIO budget should keep this in mind, as 
much of the evidence that comes back from the demonstrations will likely show few to no program effects. 
Pressure to cut ineffective programs will also come from OMB and the OAC as evidence becomes an 
increasingly important criterion for budget decisions. In the long run, the likely effect of the OEIO and the 
OAC will be that the federal government funds far fewer programs but more effective ones.
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PROPOSAL 2: EXPERIMENT WITH PROMISING AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES 
TO MOBILITY PROMOTION
For a sense of the kind of demonstrations that the OEIO might fund, I offer several examples of 
programs, approaches, and models that have demonstrated initial success. In every case, the objective 
would be to change the behaviors and aspirations of low-income parents and their children in order to 
increase rates of upward mobility from the bottom.
TEXT-MESSAGING STRATEGIES SUCH AS READY4K!
Nearly all parents want to support their young children’s learning to ensure that they are ultimately well 
prepared to enter school. Some, however, lack the knowledge and skills that others take for granted. There is 
ample evidence that inequalities in parenting are primary factors behind early-childhood cognitive disparities 
that produce later inequalities.17 The question is how to offer help to parents in a way that is inexpensive, 
practical, and minimally paternalistic.
One especially cost-effective approach is to take advantage of text messaging to provide information to 
mothers and fathers about effective parenting practices. In contrast to parenting programs that involve a small 
number of intensive face-to-face sessions, approaches based on text messaging offer continuous reinforcement 
and focus on small, actionable parenting tips. Cell phones and text-messaging plans are ubiquitous even 
among low-income families,18 and once the content of a program is developed, it subsequently has extremely 
low costs. This approach is also easily scalable and transferable, since it does not rely on implementation by 
especially skilled, invested, or dynamic staff. Most important, text-messaging approaches have been shown by 
rigorous evaluation to effectively improve parenting and child outcomes.
For example, the READY4K! program sent text messages to parents of four-year-olds in public San Francisco 
preschools three times a week, over eight months.19 The text messages were created by Ben York, a Stanford 
University graduate student in education, and his professor, Susanna Loeb, and follow a curriculum designed 
with California preschool standards in mind. They suggest actions as simple as, “When you’re bathing your 
child, point out the letters on shampoo bottles. Ask your child to name them and tell you the sounds that they 
make.”
Receipt of the texts increased the frequency of a range of literacy activities among parents, and it also 
increased parental interaction with preschool teachers. Child literacy test scores rose correspondingly, by 
0.21 to 0.34 standard deviations, which suggests that the program could close 25 percent of the reading gap 
between poor and affluent children and half the gap between poor and middle-class children.20
The overall cost of sending the messages? One dollar per family. Scaling the program up is as simple as adding 
an opt-in checkbox to preschool enrollment forms.
San Francisco has expanded the program to all its preschools and kindergartens. The creators of the program 
have added math-related texts to the program and are expanding it to 12 states in the next year. They plan 
evaluations in each state to assess more subtle aspects of the program, such as the frequency and timing of 
messages. They also plan to extend the program to younger children and to develop messaging to promote 
socio-emotional outcomes.
The success of the READY4K! program and its low cost suggest that children around the country would benefit 
from access to it or similar products. Text-messaging-based programs also have proved successful at reducing the 
“summer melt,” whereby college-bound high school graduates fail to follow through and enroll, and at improving 
student outcomes by helping parents monitor their children’s attendance and homework completion.21 
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LENA DEVICES TO ASSESS AND IMPROVE EARLY-CHILDHOOD LANGUAGE 
ACQUISITION
Research indicates that an important way that parenting matters for child outcomes is the amount 
that mothers and fathers talk with their children. A promising “talk pedometer” technology is 
now being leveraged in a variety of ways to help parents improve on this score.
A landmark study by Betty Hart and Todd Risley completed 30 years ago showed large gaps 
between lower- and upper-income families in the number of words and conversations that young 
children experienced at home.22 It found that the number of words and conversations predicted a 
child’s vocabulary growth and IQ better than parental education and their socioeconomic status.
The study was based on intense observation—but of only 42 children in Kansas. More recent 
research suggests that the “talk gap” may have been overestimated but still found that parents 
with at least a four-year college degree speak 24 percent more words to their two-year-olds than 
other parents do.23 Another recent study discovered that language gaps are apparent in infancy. 
At 18 months of age, poor children process language 25 percent more slowly than better-off 
children.24 Brain research, too, is corroborating the formative importance of spoken language in 
the early years.25
Some of the latest research on the subject uses LENA (Language ENvironment Analysis) 
technology. LENA devices are worn by young children and record the words said by and near 
them by their parents and other caregivers. The resulting data are then uploaded to a computer, 
and dedicated software analyzes them to provide easy-to-digest feedback to parents about the 
number of words that their children hear and the extent of conversational interaction that takes 
place with them.
These LENA devices have been applied in different ways in a variety of interventions. In Rhode 
Island, the Providence Talks program pairs the devices with home visits by Early Head Start 
and other caseworkers. Participants receive personalized feedback and coaching tips from the 
caseworkers based on reports tallying words, conversational turns, and the amount of television 
exposure over the course of a day. The program is experimenting with giving cash transfers to 
parents, conditional on their meeting specified targets.
The LENA Research Foundation, meanwhile, has developed its own program, LENA Start, in 
recognition of the importance of developing affordable and scalable models that don’t require 
individual case management. LENA Start includes a curriculum for eight weekly group meetings 
by parents who are all using the LENA device, as well as a LENA mobile app and cloud-based 
access to data. It recently partnered with the San Mateo (California) County Library and Huntsville 
(Alabama) City Schools for its inaugural runs and expects to add more sites this fall.
The devices could be used by other local efforts to address the talk gap, tailored to their own 
objectives and priorities. The devices could be used to assess the quality of teaching and 
interaction in day-care centers and pre-K programs rather than being aimed at parents. Or 
perhaps a completely hands-off cash-for-talk approach might prove at least somewhat effective, 
where parents are simply given LENA devices and agree to share the data in order to assess 
whether any number of outcome targets have been attained, triggering a cash reward to the 
parents.
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CONVERT LARGE SCHOOLS WITH HIGH DROP-OUT RATES INTO SMALL, 
PERSONALIZED SCHOOLS 
In the early 2000s, New York launched a systemic, district-wide effort to reform its worst high schools, 
known as “drop-out labs.” Twenty-three large public schools that were failing their students were shut 
down and replaced with more than 200 new small schools, each with about 100 students per grade. The 
schools were organized around smaller, more personalized units, giving students a better chance of 
being known and noticed. They emphasized academic rigor, personal relationships between students 
and faculty, and community partnerships to provide learning opportunities outside the classroom. And 
they were open to all students.
In a study of more than 20,000 students enrolled in these new “small schools of choice,” MDRC, an 
evaluation firm that specializes in randomized controlled trial experiments, found that these schools had 
a number of large and sustained effects on student outcomes. High school graduation rates increased 
by 9.4 percentage points, and college enrollment rates grew by 8.4 percentage points.26 These effects 
were experienced by almost all students, regardless of race or sex, and whether they were at or below 
grade level in math or reading. And they achieved these effects at a cost per graduate lower than in the 
high schools attended by control-group members, by 14 to 16 percent.27 The savings came from higher 
graduation rates, resulting in fewer students needing to attend a fifth year of high school.
The schools were developed through a competitive proposal process designed to stimulate innovative 
ideas from a range of stakeholders. Most were founded with community partners that provided faculty 
with additional staffing support and resources during start-up and that now offer students learning 
opportunities inside and outside the classroom. The district contributed start-up funding (with support 
from philanthropy) as well as technical assistance to each of the small schools.
Providence, Rhode Island, recently announced that it was adopting the small schools of choice model, 
and the U.S. Department of Education just endorsed the approach for School Improvement Grant 
applications.28 
CAREER ACADEMIES
Career Academies offer a promising high school reform that has been widely adopted over the past 
40 years but that could widen academic and vocational opportunities for many more students across 
the country. The approach provides vocational training to high school students organized into small 
learning communities (“academies”) within their high school. But unlike traditional vocational programs, 
Career Academies wrap a college-prep curriculum around a career theme, such as hospitality and 
tourism or health sciences. Students take courses tied to the theme alongside traditional academic 
instruction, applying English, math, and science within the thematic course work. Academies also 
establish partnerships with local employers and business associations to provide opportunities such as 
job shadowing, internships, and career awareness activities.
MDRC found that participation in Career Academies produced average earnings gains of 11 percent—
over $2,000 per year, sustained over eight years.29 Among young men with a history of difficulty in the 
labor market, the increase was 17 percent on average, or $3,700 per year. Career Academies also had 
strong effects on high school graduation and receipt of a postsecondary degree or credential. And 
young men were more likely to be married and to be custodial parents if they had children. While there 
are thousands of these programs around the country, just 5 percent of high school students have the 
opportunity to participate in a Career Academy.
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PROPOSAL 3: BLOCK-GRANT MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS AND SEND THEM 
TO THE STATES
Rather than try to directly change parents and children, the biggest federal social policy programs over 
the past 50 years have focused on giving the poor benefits such as cash, vouchers for food, payments 
to medical providers, and other forms of financial assistance. While these programs were not explicitly 
intended to increase upward mobility, many observers, commentators, and policymakers have assumed 
that they do because of the popular view that poverty itself is the primary cause of immobility. Not 
only is this belief questionable, the idea that antipoverty programs increase mobility must ignore the 
disincentives to engage in mobility-promoting behavior embedded in many safety-net programs.
The proposal here would extend the lessons of the 1990s welfare reforms to the rest of the federal 
safety net. It would promote independence and facilitate state experimentation and flexibility, and it 
would simplify the safety net by consolidating programs.
THE SAFETY NET BEFORE THE 1990s: ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS AS ANTI-
MOBILITY PROGRAMS
The fact that poor children often end up poor as adults does not mean that poverty per se is particularly 
consequential for mobility. Able-bodied native-born parents with persistently low incomes tend to be poor 
for two reasons: they lack the skills and personal qualities sought by employers; and many experience 
family disruption. It is no imposition of judgment to recognize that parents lacking the personal assets 
that make for economic success will have a more difficult time inculcating mobility-promoting skills 
and personal qualities in their children.30 It is not judgmental to conclude that mothers and fathers who 
have unplanned pregnancies are, in the aggregate, more likely than other parents to have values and 
aspirations that run counter to upward mobility, which then will tend to be passed on to their children.
If economic resources were what mattered for upward mobility, we would expect to see rising mobility 
over time because poverty has fallen. Official figures show that 17 percent of American children were 
poor in 1967 and that 22 percent were in 2012. But those figures fail to count income from most of the 
biggest antipoverty programs in determining who is poor.31 The calculation of the poverty line also results 
in a threshold that grows faster than the cost of living, so that it takes more and more inflation-adjusted 
income to be considered nonpoor.32
Correcting the flaws in the official measure would show that child poverty declined from something like 
one-third to 19 percent over this period.33 That improvement has come at great public expense. In 2011, 
the federal government spent $750 billion on antipoverty programs. Per poor person, that amounts to 
more than a sixfold increase since 1968, after taking into account the higher cost of living.34
However, most evidence indicates that intergenerational mobility has changed very little for adults in the 
past 40 years.35 After spending about $20 trillion at the state and federal levels since 1965 on antipoverty 
programs, we have improved the living conditions of untold millions of low-income children, but we have 
not increased the likelihood that they will reach the middle class as adults.36
In fact, there are reasons to believe that our means-tested programs are an important part of the 
problem. Many federal safety-net programs include features that inadvertently discourage upward 
mobility. They lower the costs of having children out of wedlock at a young age, of reducing effort 
in school, and of choosing not to obtain additional education. Safety-net programs also create 
disincentives to work, save, and get or remain married.  
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THE MOBILITY-PROMOTING REFORMS OF THE 1990S AS A MODEL
During the 1990s, policy reforms changed the nature of the help that low-income Americans receive 
from the federal government and succeeded at reducing the anti-mobility features of the major cash 
assistance program (then called Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC; today called 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF). The welfare-reform legislation that passed in 
1996—having been preceded by more modest reforms in 1988 and state experimentation during 
the early 1990s—made it more difficult to receive benefits and more unpleasant to stay on the rolls, 
by introducing time limits to receipt of benefits and imposing stringent work requirements. It block-
granted welfare benefits, ending the entitlement of eligible families to assistance. Teenage mothers 
were required to live with an adult and be in school or a training program to receive benefits. States 
were given flexibility to impose other requirements on beneficiaries and to otherwise tailor their 
programs as they saw fit.
While federal support for nonworking adults became less generous in the 1990s, spending to support 
less-skilled workers became more generous. The Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded, the partially 
refundable Child Tax Credit was created, and spending on child-care programs was increased. The State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program was created to serve those ineligible for Medicaid because their 
incomes were too high.
Will this formula for antipoverty policy—more support for the working poor, less for the nonworking 
poor—increase upward mobility among poor children? We will not know for a few more years, as 
children who were born in the 1990s are no more than 25 years old. But there are strong reasons to 
think that welfare reform has expanded child opportunity and therefore that reform of other means-
tested programs along the same lines would do so, too. As I have discussed elsewhere, the trends in 
income, poverty, employment, and out-of-wedlock births all improved in ways consistent with safety-net 
reforms having beneficial effects starting in the 1990s.37
The problems with the old AFDC program remain in other means-tested programs today, some of 
which are bigger than TANF, AFDC’s replacement. Practically none of these programs have any work 
requirements or time limits. And the perverse incentives embedded in AFDC are compounded by 
the sprawling nature of antipoverty policies today. An array of programs, scattered across multiple 
agencies and each with its own rules and requirements, has left states with few options for untangling 
the knotted safety net through innovation and cross-program coordination. The expanded safety 
net has also pushed up the value of the package of benefits available to single-parent families. The 
Congressional Budget Office has noted that a single mother receiving $20,000 in government benefits 
contemplating a job paying $30,000 will be better off by less than $10,000 if she chooses work.38 There 
are income levels where earning additional dollars results in only ten cents more in discretionary income.
BUILDING ON WELFARE REFORM
Reforms to safety-net programs, then, that promote independence, state experimentation, and 
consolidation have the potential to increase upward mobility. Two leading approaches along these lines 
have been proposed: one by Senator Marco Rubio; and the other by Congressman Paul Ryan.
The Rubio proposal, modeled on a design developed by policy researcher Oren Cass, would package 
most or all antipoverty programs into a “Flex Fund” that would be sent to the states in proportion to 
their current spending, with few strings attached.39 Rather than emphasizing work requirements, the 
Flex Fund would largely serve the nonworking poor, with wage subsidies for the working poor (see 
Proposal 4, below).
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Ryan proposes a pilot program rather than a wholesale overhaul.40 He would consolidate 11 means-
tested programs—including TANF, food stamps, and the major public housing programs—and give 
states wide latitude over how the “Opportunity Grant” is spent (though less latitude than the Rubio 
proposal). Unlike the Rubio proposal, Ryan’s would mandate work requirements and time limits 
(except for the elderly and disabled). His plan would also require states to centrally involve nonprofit 
organizations and local service providers generally, giving low-income beneficiaries their choice 
of eligible providers for hands-on case management. The providers would develop life plans with 
beneficiaries and hold them accountable.
The proposal here would adopt elements of both the Rubio and the Ryan approach. Specifically, it 
would modify the Ryan approach in three ways. First, rather than a pilot project, the current proposal 
would (like Rubio’s) be intended to apply nationally. The reforms would be phased in over five years, 
with a number of state pilots initiated in the first year and monitored over the phase-in period to ensure 
that there are no unanticipated problems. It would automatically be expanded nationally after this 
phase-in period, barring legislation to repeal the legislation. During the phase-in, states that participate 
would have to abide by the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit reforms proposed below, 
which would also expand nationally after five years.
Second, this proposal would add the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program as a 12th to be 
rolled into the block grant.41 SSI has been abused by states and families since welfare reform passed. 
States have moved families from TANF rolls—where they could make it more difficult to fulfill work 
participation requirements and where they must be partly supported by state funds—to SSI, which is 
almost entirely funded by the federal government and which has no work requirements. The absence of 
those requirements and of time limits makes SSI attractive to families who would otherwise have to rely 
on TANF.
As a consequence, a rising share of SSI cases involve children with diagnoses involving mental health 
and behavioral problems, such as attention deficit disorder, that are difficult to assess.42 Once in receipt 
of SSI, parents face perverse incentives in that strong or improved school performance can disqualify 
children from the program. And a sizable share of adolescents receiving SSI move directly onto Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) rolls upon reaching adulthood. Giving states full responsibility for 
what SSI currently funds would remove the incentives for them to shift families onto what is arguably 
today’s most mobility-inhibiting federal program.
The third modification to the Ryan proposal is that states would not be required to use local nonprofit 
service providers as frontline administrators; nor would administrators be required to create life plans 
for their clients. Allowing states to choose different approaches would provide valuable information 
about the value-added of the local-provider/life-plan strategy.
As with Ryan’s and Rubio’s proposals, this one would require states to spend block-granted dollars—
amounting to roughly $200 billion in appropriations in 2012—on the poor rather than diverting the 
funding elsewhere, and it would mandate that states develop success measures and evaluate their 
programs. It would also include a countercyclical element in that funds would be available to increase 
the size of block grants in the event that unemployment rises above a threshold.
Like the Ryan proposal, but possibly in contrast to Rubio’s, the current proposal would include work 
requirements and time limits. Such restrictions are essential as a way of overcoming the high marginal 
tax rates that discourage beneficiaries of means-tested aid from working. As with the 1996 welfare 
reform, states would be allowed to exempt a share of their caseloads from these requirements—in 
particular, the parents of children with substantial disabilities—and reductions in the size of their 
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caseloads would count toward the percentage of beneficiaries that must be engaged in work-related 
activity. It cannot be emphasized enough that some adults will be unable to secure stable employment—
even in good economic times—and any work requirement or time limit should include exemptions to 
anticipate the problems of the most disadvantaged beneficiaries.
The proposal here would reduce real spending on the programs in question over time by holding the 
amount of block grants at fixed levels rather than letting them grow in line with projected increases in 
program spending. While critics claim that block-granting would result in inadequate funding for those 
in need, they fail to acknowledge the way in which the fixed TANF block grant—supplemented with 
countercyclical funding—produced more funds available per beneficiary, as welfare reform reduced the 
number of people on the rolls.43 The same dynamic would likely occur with the new block grants; and 
if it did not, the pilot program could be ended and the critics would have firm evidence for their claims, 
which they currently lack.
PROPOSAL 4: ENCOURAGE EMPLOYMENT THROUGH WORK SUBSIDIES
As noted, demanding more of the nonworking poor was only half of the successful welfare-reform 
formula of the 1990s. The other crucial component was expanded work supports. The Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), in particular, was enlarged substantially in President Clinton’s 1993 budget. Further 
reforming safety-net programs along the lines above—if the well-being of low-income families is to be 
enhanced—would require more generous work supports as well.
Most of the relevant policy discussion today revolves around relatively modest expansions of the EITC 
for childless workers, a worthy objective that has generated bipartisan support. The proposal here 
would instead adopt an element of Senator Rubio’s antipoverty plan and convert the EITC to a federal 
wage subsidy calculated by employers and delivered through paychecks.
The wage subsidy would be similar to the EITC in that it would increase as workers earn more, up to 
a threshold, and would decline with additional earnings above a second threshold. It would differ in 
that the same subsidy would be delivered to qualified workers regardless of whether they are married 
or have children. This would remove the disincentive to marriage in the current EITC, where a single 
mother stands to lose much or all of her EITC benefit if she weds. Additional support for parents would 
be delivered through the revamped Child Tax Credit (CTC), discussed below. The reformed system of 
wage subsidies would also significantly boost the pay of single men who are childless or do not have 
custody of their children. To the extent that the additional income makes many men better able, in the 
eyes of women, to contribute to their family’s financial security, the elimination of the marriage penalty 
will make marriage that much more attractive.
By receiving the wage subsidy monthly, beneficiaries would be better able to integrate the additional 
amount into their budgets and would avoid the temptation to spend the money on big-ticket splurges 
at tax time. The subsidy would be paid out as a new reverse payroll tax, which would simultaneously 
eliminate the EITC fraud concerns that conservative lawmakers have emphasized and the necessity 
among many EITC recipients of getting paid help with their taxes to determine their eligibility for the 
credit.
The level of the new wage subsidy amounts and phase-in/-out parameters should be set so that the 
average worker receives roughly $2,500. The average tax return claiming the EITC received a benefit of 
$2,407 in 2013, and that incorporated payments for the support of children that would be incorporated 
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into the CTC proposal below.44 Because of this and because the subsidies to single childless workers 
and to married couples would increase, the proposal here would be significantly more generous than 
the current EITC. I estimate that this reform would cost roughly $40 billion more annually than the 
current EITC.45 It would be funded through reduced spending from the block-grant proposal above.46 
PROPOSAL 5: ENCOURAGE DELAYED AND PLANNED CHILDBEARING 
THROUGH TAX INCENTIVES
With wage subsidies no longer reflecting the number of children a worker has, the proposal here would 
expand the CTC. However, it would do so by offering much greater support to married couples than 
to single-parent families. In so doing, it would incentivize delayed, planned, and marital childbearing 
without penalizing single parents. Since a large body of evidence suggests that stable intact families 
are crucial for upward mobility, reforming the CTC along these lines might be expected to expand child 
opportunity.47
Under current policy, taxpayers qualify for a credit of up to $1,000 per child, regardless of marital status. 
The credit phases out rapidly at upper incomes, and it is refundable for those with little to no income-
tax liability (a credit worth 15 percent of earnings above $3,000, up to $1,000 per child).The new 
proposal would be to retain the CTC as is for single parents but to expand it significantly for married 
couples, particularly those with the lowest incomes. Specifically, couples filing jointly could receive up 
to $4,000 per child, with the credit refundable as under current law. The phaseout would begin at the 
income level of the 20th percentile of married couples and would continue at a phaseout rate such that 
the credit reached $0 at the same income level that it does today for joint filers.48
The reformed CTC would create a significant incentive for low-income Americans to delay childbearing 
until marriage. In recent years, the biggest effort to affect marriage and childbearing was the expansion 
of marriage-promotion and responsible-father programs in the legislation reauthorizing welfare reform 
in 2002. The programs largely proved failures, and no one since has offered a new approach.
There is a lesson to be taken from the 1990s welfare-reform efforts to incentivize work. Through state 
and local experimentation, it eventually became clear that programs to teach hard and soft skills to 
welfare recipients, or to instruct them in résumé-writing and job-search strategies, were fairly ineffective. 
What worked better was demanding “work first”—that is, emphasizing that beneficiaries find a job 
and move off the rolls as soon as they could—and providing supports to women who made the leap to 
employment, through wage subsidies and health and child care benefits.
Often, what the federal government does best is not to create and administer programs that persuade 
people to change their behavior but to provide financial incentives to the same effect. There may be a 
place for marriage-promotion programs, social marketing campaigns, exhortations from the bully pulpit, 
and efforts to expand access to birth control; but a reformed CTC would be a clear and simple signal 
to low-income Americans: over a decade, being a married parent of two children would yield $60,000 
more than being a single parent.49
This reform, I estimate, would cost $60–$70 billion annually.50 It would be covered by means of savings 
from reforming Social Security Disability Insurance51 (see below); by reforming mandatory spending 
programs and tax provisions so that various parameters affecting eligibility, benefits levels, and tax 
brackets would be adjusted for the cost of living using the “chained Consumer Price Index” rather than 
the current adjustment;52 and by a variety of spending cuts.53 
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PROPOSAL 6: REFORM THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE 
PROGRAM
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has dissuaded increasing numbers of able-
bodied men and women from working, limiting upward mobility over adults’ working years and, 
in some cases, eroding the work ethic of their children and those in their communities.54 It has 
become easier to enroll in the program; once enrolled, few adults ever return to work. Reforming 
the program so that fewer people view it as attractive relative to low-wage work would thus 
promote upward mobility.
RISING WORKFORCE DROPOUT AMONG MEN—AND MORE WITH MEDICAL 
CONDITIONS?
In 1951, 97 percent of men between the ages of 25 and 54 either worked or looked for work.55 By 
1970, this “labor force participation rate” remained at 96 percent. But that slight drop would grow 
into a substantial one in subsequent years. In 2013, it stood at 88 percent. Most of these men were 
uninterested in working.56 Between 1994 and 2006, among nonretired, nondisabled, working-age 
men who were not working or looking for work, the share who told government surveyors that 
they did not want a job rose from 56 percent to 73 percent, representing a historical high point. 
We can’t determine how many out-of-the-workforce men generally—including the retired and 
disabled—wanted a job during this period, but in 1993, 70 percent said that they did not. Virtually 
the entire decline in labor force participation among working-age men between 1979 and 2006—
two strong years in the business cycle—is attributable to an increase in the number of such men 
who are uninterested in a job.
The biggest reason for the growth in working-age men not in the labor force and not interested 
in a job was a corresponding rise in self-reported disability or sickness. The increase in disability 
accounted for about one-third of the decline in labor force participation between 1969 and 2013, 
over twice the decline accounted for by increases in keeping house and taking care of family, in 
going to school, or in retirement, which each explained 15 percent of the drop.57
Consistent with this increase in self-reported disability, the percentage of Americans receiving 
federal disability payments rose from 3 percent in 1974 to 6.5 percent by 2010.58 Much of the 
growth occurred after 1995, and nearly all of it from rising enrollment in SSDI. (The rest of it came 
from rising enrollment in the Supplemental Security Income program, which I propose including 
in the block grant proposed above.) The percentage of men receiving SSDI payments doubled 
between 1970 and 2010.59 
HOW SSDI BECAME AN ALTERNATIVE TO WORK FOR THE ABLE-BODIED
Aging and the increase in the Social Security retirement age can explain some of the rise in SSDI 
receipt, but no more than half.60 And the health status of Americans has not worsened over 
these years. Instead, a variety of policy changes in the mid-1980s made it easier for out-of-work 
Americans with relatively minor health problems but major employment challenges to qualify for 
SSDI. A rising share of SSDI recipients has qualified for benefits only because they are deemed 
unable to do work given their age, education, and work experience, rather than because they have 
a well-defined impairment included in the Social Security Administration’s elaborate listing. A rising 
share has also qualified as a result of difficult-to-confirm back problems or other “musculoskeletal” 
impairments or mental impairments such as anxiety or depression.
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More and more SSDI applicants are rejected (twice) but then contest their initial denials in an 
administrative hearing, where more and more of them are represented by a lawyer. Those hearings 
involve no representation of the federal government’s or the taxpayers’ interests, save the judge, 
who must also represent the best interests of the applicant. Great deference is paid to the reports 
of the applicant’s physician. The judges are under impossible time constraints. The result is that they 
overturn large majorities of the denials when applicants persist in having a hearing—over 79 percent of 
them in 2010.61
The evidence that a significant number of SSDI beneficiaries are actually able to work is 
overwhelming.62 Among adults who report a work limitation, fewer and fewer are working over 
time, and more and more are receiving SSDI benefits.63 In theory, the rise in SSDI receipt could 
primarily reflect a collapse in demand for less skilled workers; but again, the rise in male labor 
force dropout is accounted for by an increase in men who do not want a job. And the last time 
that skeptics argued that work-promoting safety-net reforms would hurt those affected was 
during the 1990s welfare-reform debates, and the skeptics were wrong.
FIXING SSDI
I recently proposed a series of reforms to shore up the nearly insolvent Disability Insurance (DI) 
Trust Fund, reduce the growth of SSDI rolls, and make it more difficult for able-bodied adults to 
join the rolls and to remain eligible.64 A short-term reallocation of the payroll tax would extend 
the solvency of the trust fund a few years, until the structural reforms take over.
Policy changes that would promote the creation of markets in private long-term unemployment 
insurance would give the long-term unemployed who are not impaired security against 
employment shocks. Experience rating of the DI payroll tax would be piloted. This reform would 
tie employers’ payroll tax rate for DI to the use of SSDI by their employees, giving businesses 
incentives to prevent disability and rehabilitate and accommodate workers who become disabled.
Receipt of unemployment benefits prior to applying for SSDI would render an applicant ineligible 
for the program unless he could qualify on the basis of the SSA medical listings, and the same 
would be true of applicants who worked less than two-thirds of the time over the preceding 
six years. Applicants and beneficiaries qualifying on the basis of musculoskeletal or mental 
conditions would need to demonstrate that they had sought out treatment and were complying 
with therapy.
SSDI reform should also update and maintain the listing of jobs used to determine whether 
someone can perform any work, so that it reflects the greater prevalence of jobs with few 
physical demands compared with those 25 to 35 years ago. Attorneys and physicians advocating 
for patients should be held more accountable. The deference given the view of applicants’ 
physicians should be lessened. Additional examiners, judges, and other staff should be hired to 
lessen the incentives to just move people through the application and appeals process.
Other reforms would include requiring the least severely impaired beneficiaries to reapply after 
three years and increasing full reviews of moderately impaired beneficiaries. SSDI benefits would 
be reduced at the early-retirement age of Social Security to what they would be if the beneficiary 
switched from SSDI to Social Security pensions. Funding would be provided to eliminate the 
900,000-case backlog of beneficiary reviews. The cost-of-living adjustment for benefit increases 
would be switched so that inflation was not overstated.
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PROPOSAL 7: UNLEASH INVESTOR MARKETS TO FINANCE STUDENTS’ 
HIGHER EDUCATION
Higher education today is beset by a number of problems. Most obviously, the costs of attending 
college have skyrocketed. The average college’s tuition and fees rose 2 to 2.5 times as much as after-
tax income between 1979 and 2007 in two- and four-year public institutions and four-year private 
institutions.65 This increase in higher-education costs is tempered, however, by the fact that gaps in 
median earnings by educational attainment have grown for both men and women, indicating that 
higher education represents an increasingly valuable investment.66 
More severe than affordability, however, is the problem of college preparedness, which results in many 
students dropping out of college before obtaining a credential, often with student debt that they are 
obligated to pay. Another issue in higher education is that schools face little accountability for poor 
outcomes for students. To four-year colleges and universities, upperclassmen are relatively expensive, 
since classes are smaller and more likely to be taught by tenured professors, and since many juniors and 
seniors live off campus. Freshmen and sophomores are cheaper for schools to educate. Schools thus 
have few incentives to address high dropout rates.
Our outdated system of credentialing is another problem. The types of credentials available through 
postsecondary pursuits are unduly limited, with an outsize emphasis on two- and four-year degrees from 
accredited schools. Institutions of higher learning face limited competition from innovators because 
students obtaining education services from nontraditional providers do not qualify for federal aid. It is 
unnecessarily difficult to assemble customized courses of study by combining classes—perhaps online 
ones—from multiple institutions. Incumbent colleges and universities thwart innovation by controlling 
the accreditation process.
Given limited competition and accountability, federal aid to college students in the form of grants, tax 
breaks, and student loan subsidies probably allows schools to raise their tuition and fees more than they 
otherwise could.
MARKETS IN HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING TO THE RESCUE
Reforming the way the nation finances higher education could address nearly all these problems. The 
solution is to clear the way for markets in human capital investment. Senator Rubio and former congressman 
Tom Petri introduced legislation last year that would do just that, creating a legal framework for “income 
share agreements” (ISAs).67
ISAs are contracts between students and investors whereby investors agree to a specific amount of financial 
assistance for higher-education expenses in exchange for a claim on a specific percentage of the student’s 
future income for a specific number of years.68 Just as entrepreneurs are willing to pay future dividends to 
shareholders in return for capital to invest in their businesses, many students would benefit from voluntarily 
paying “dividends” to “shareholders” to invest in their own human capital. As with shareholders in 
companies, investors in students’ human capital would be able to buy and sell these contracts.
In addressing the major problems with higher education, ISAs would have many advantages over student 
and parental loans, the main alternatives to financing higher education for most students. In terms of 
affordability concerns, ISAs have all the benefits of the income-based repayment options available for some 
types of federal student loans. But they would help prevent students from borrowing more than makes 
sense, given their likely economic situation after college, and they would help students to borrow more if 
that made economic sense.
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An important difference between student loans with income-based repayment and ISAs is that 
student loans are awarded without regard to a student’s ability to pay, while ISAs will tend to 
have better terms if someone is likely to command relatively high earnings and worse terms 
if someone is not. For some people, it doesn’t make sense to take on substantial debt if a 
person’s chosen school or program of study is unlikely to result in sufficiently high earnings, 
or if the person will have trouble attracting enough pay, regardless of school or program. Not 
everyone should be in a four-year college, for instance. Investors who determine that someone 
will not be likely to command much pay if he pursues his preferred path will offer unfavorable 
terms if the person insists on following that path. In this way, ISAs will tend to direct students 
toward schools and courses of study that are likely to pay off in higher earnings, increasing 
upward mobility.
From the opposite side, students for whom it does make sense to seek out substantial debt or 
financing will benefit more from ISAs, too. Students who are good risks will have a relatively easy 
time securing ISA terms that provide the full financing they seek. In contrast, Stafford loans have 
caps on the amount that may be borrowed. Above those caps, students must rely on private loans 
or Parent PLUS loans, which impose greater risk on students and parents because they generally 
lack income-based repayment options.
The risk is particularly large for low-income students and their families, who often must borrow 
more than others. Poor students’ future income levels may feel or be more uncertain than those 
of more advantaged students. If they experience periods of unemployment or low earnings, low-
income students will tend to have less in the way of savings for a cushion (and may be less able 
to count on help from family). Not only will the greater risk facing low-income students tend 
to dissuade them and their families from taking on substantial debt; lenders may be unwilling 
to extend credit to low-income students or their parents on acceptable terms for fear that the 
borrowers may be unable to repay if they get into financial trouble.
In addition to addressing affordability, ISAs would be superior to student and parent loans as 
a way of holding schools accountable. Student and parental loans don’t provide any signal to 
borrowers about how profitable their human capital investment is likely to be. Student loan 
interest rates bear no relationship to school quality. In the absence of such signaling, schools 
have less incentive to be as effective as possible at educating their students.
ISAs, on the other hand, would leverage market mechanisms to pressure schools to improve their 
effectiveness. Schools that persistently failed their students would become unpopular relative 
to effective schools. Investors would offer worse terms to students attending institutions that 
produce low-earning graduates (or that fail to graduate their students), and they would offer 
better terms to students choosing effective schools. The market “prices” would themselves 
convey information about school quality to parents and students that is missing or hard to come 
by today.
ISAs would also do a better job solving the competition problem than federal loans do. Since 
these loans are generally available only for students attending schools that have successfully 
applied to participate in the federal loan programs, which must be accredited by existing bodies, 
students seeking more innovative educational options have to resort to private loans to pay for 
educational expenses. ISAs would offer students terms to finance options that appear to be good 
bets. ISA investors will be willing to take on the risk of supporting innovation, while taxpayers will 
generally be averse to subsidizing students pursuing unorthodox avenues.
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Finally, ISAs have the potential to rein in tuition inflation. The interest on many student loans is 
subsidized by the federal government, and Parent and Grad PLUS loans are unlimited up to the cost 
of attendance. These features of federal student loans contribute—along with the relative absence 
of accountability and competition—to ever-rising higher-education costs because colleges are less 
constrained in setting tuition than they would otherwise be. ISAs would force schools to compete with 
one another on price to a much greater extent than is required of them today. To the extent that they 
successfully supported innovative approaches to higher education that do not resemble today’s two- 
and four-year colleges, competition on price would be even greater.
Miguel Palacios, Tonio DeSorrento, and Andrew Kelly have noted that for ISAs to catch on, more than 
legal clarification will be required.69 They recommend imposing loan limits on the Parent and Grad 
PLUS programs to curb overborrowing and to carve out a space for ISAs to develop, modifying student 
loan policies in anticipation of interactions between loans and ISAs when students combine the two 
funding approaches, and increasing access to data on school and student outcomes to provide more 
information for investors to evaluate risks.
In addition, accreditation reforms would ensure that ISAs can maximally transform the higher-education 
landscape. As Congressman Paul Ryan’s opportunity “discussion draft” noted: “Students who build 
a customized plan of study need some sort of credential to show employers they have learned the 
necessary skills.”70 Credentialing along these lines would aid ISA investors. The draft builds on reforms 
initially proposed by Senator Mike Lee. It calls for easing the process of Department of Education 
recognition of new accreditors and for allowing accreditation of individual courses rather than entire 
schools or programs, among other measures. The idea would be to allow students to assemble their 
own program of accredited courses to qualify for an accredited degree.
CONCLUSION: DON’T LOOK DOWN, BUT DON’T BACK DOWN
Efforts to promote upward mobility have proceeded for decades from the view that the American 
economy has failed the poor and the middle class. It follows from this premise that the federal 
government must therefore rely on centrally managed safety-net and entitlement programs that eschew 
markets, dynamism, and choice and deemphasize personal initiative, responsibility, and risk-bearing.
But while the rate at which our lives improve has slowed, the living standards of the American poor and 
the middle class are higher than at any time before the twenty-first century and not meaningfully lower 
than any point in the past 15 years. Upward mobility has not diminished; by some measures, the U.S. 
produces a comparable amount as its peer nations, despite relying less on government. An opportunity 
agenda that cannot recognize the strengths of the American economic system and views every aspect 
of it pessimistically is one that is doomed to prescribe overly interventionist solutions that sacrifice too 
much to counter threats that are far less serious than critics imagine.
Defenders of markets and decentralization, however, have largely ceded opportunity policy to the 
pessimists; consequently, the crisis view of economic opportunity is the dominant one in American 
public discourse. The insights and epistemological modesty of advocates of limited government are 
sorely needed today. But they must be melded with an acknowledgment that the inability of newborns 
to choose their birth circumstances requires a moral commitment to doing what is practical to help 
children born into disadvantage to rise out of it. We cannot simply shrug in the face of inequalities of 
opportunity that prove stubbornly resistant to intervention.
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APPENDIX: IS THIS TIME DIFFERENT? WILL UPWARD MOBILITY FALL, AND 
HAS INCOME CONCENTRATION HURT MOBILITY?
To sidestep the large body of evidence showing minimal change in the mobility experienced by adults 
in recent decades, analysts like the political scientist Robert Putnam argue that today’s children will 
nevertheless experience less mobility than previous generations by the time they are adults.71 There 
are certainly inequalities between poor and rich children that are growing. But those who point to the 
growth of gaps in indicators such as eating family dinners at the table have not demonstrated that 
these early inequalities between poor and rich children are significantly related to adult educational and 
economic outcomes.72 
The extent to which rising disparities between rich and poor children also widens inequalities in 
adulthood depends not only on whether the childhood and adulthood outcomes are related but on 
the extent to which having increasingly better childhood outcomes continues to benefit rich children as 
adults. For instance, additional parental income enjoyed by the child of a multimillionaire may produce 
only small advantages as compared with the income enjoyed by the child of a less affluent millionaire. 
Given already-large childhood disparities, further widening of those disparities need not lead to 
significant increases in adulthood inequality if the returns to having more of the childhood resource are 
small for high-income children.
While some societal and economic changes might be expected to reduce upward mobility from the 
bottom, other disparities between rich and poor children have diminished. Exposure to lead paint is less 
common among poor children than in the past, and crime and drug use have fallen. Teen births have 
plummeted, and unplanned births have probably also declined. Racial discrimination has diminished. 
Parental educational attainment has risen. These are all barriers to mobility that affect the poor much 
more than they do other Americans.
Even where early inequalities have grown wider, it is often the case that both rich and poor children are 
doing better than in the past; it’s just that the rich have seen bigger gains than the poor. This is the case 
for household income, for instance—child poverty has fallen significantly since the 1980s, but incomes 
at the top have increased much more. Inequality growth when everyone improves is fundamentally 
different from a situation in which the poor see deterioration.
The claim that “this time is different” and that upward mobility among today’s children will be worse 
than in recent generations often highlights rising income concentration. But if rising income inequality 
is harmful to upward mobility, today’s late-twentysomethings should already have experienced less 
mobility than previous generations because they experienced both widening income inequality 
between the poor and the middle class during the early 1980s, when they were very young and 
rising income concentration at the top throughout their childhood. But these young adults have 
experienced no less mobility than the past two generations.73 
This points to problems with accounts that link income inequality to lower mobility. Not only do the 
two not track each other well over time in the U.S.—mobility flat while inequality rises—but they 
don’t track each other particularly well across countries or American labor markets.74 The literature 
addressing whether higher inequality leads to lower mobility is wholly unconvincing, generally 
amounting to correlations that might easily be explained by other factors.75 It is not even clear that 
increasing income at the bottom translates into meaningfully better outcomes above some relatively 
low threshold of poverty.76 
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Source: Donald Schneider and Scott Winship, “The Great Gatsby Curve Revisited, Part 1: Does 
More Inequality Correspond with Less Economic Mobility Across Local Job Markets?,” 2013, http://
economics21.org/commentary/great-gastby-curve-revisited-part-1; analysis of data provided by Chetty 
et al. (2014).
Various analyses have concluded that rising income concentration has resulted in the poor and 
the middle class experiencing much slower income growth than they would have seen, but only 
by making two unacknowledged assumptions: that in the absence of rising income concentration, 
the economy would have grown by just as much as it has; and that inequality between the bottom 
half and the upper middle class would not have grown.77
Ultimately, in evaluating changes in inequality, it is necessary to have a subjective benchmark 
of what is or would have been fair. Typically, observers and analysts concerned about inequality 
assert that the incomes of the middle class and the poor should grow at the same rate as their 
productivity. In fact, in the aggregate, compensation and productivity growth have tracked each 
other remarkably well when analyzed correctly.78 
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Source: Author’s analyses of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts data. 
See Scott Winship, “Has Inequality Driven a Wedge Between Productivity and Compensation Growth?,” 
Forbes.com, October 20, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottwinship/2014/10/20/has-inequality-
driven-a-wedge-between-productivity-and-compensation-growth
What we do not know—because the data do not exist to tell us—is whether the compensation growth 
of poor and middle-class workers has tracked their own productivity growth. Consider, however, that 
the average pretax income in the top 1 percent of households in 1979 was 9.9 times the average in the 
middle fifth. By 2007, it was 28.4 times the average. The disparity between the two groups increased by 
a factor of 2.9 (28.4/9.9).79 If the value added by those in the top 1 percent grew 2.9 times as much as 
the value added by those in the middle fifth over this period, then the rise in income concentration from 
1979 to 2007 is exactly what we would expect.
Alternatively, the value added at the top may not have been fully reflected by the top’s average income 
in 1979 because incentives for tax avoidance were much greater when top tax rates were higher or 
because cultural norms suppressed top incomes before eroding over time. For instance, during the 
mid-twentieth century, it was still a widely shared value that a male breadwinner should be able to 
support a family on one paycheck. That ideal, however imperfectly realized, reined in top incomes, to 
some extent, because middle- and working-class men received more than their productivity would have 
dictated. As the male breadwinner ideal eroded over time—weakened by the dramatic increase in wives’ 
participation in the labor force—the restraint on top incomes diminished, and those incomes more 
closely came to reflect the value added of top managers and executives.
Indirect support for this interpretation of income-concentration trends is provided by corporate tax-
return data, which show that the top 2 percent of corporations went from receiving roughly 84 percent 
of corporate income in 1979 to over 95 percent in 2007.80 The top 1 percent of households saw their 
share of household income rise from 9 percent to 19 percent over the same period.81 Household income 
is much less concentrated than corporate income, but that was truer in 1979 than in 2007.
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